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EDITED BY

FREDERICK C. GRANT and BURTON S. EASTON

FOUNDED BY SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

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NUMBER 1

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NUMBER 1

THE PONTIC MOUSE

By MORTON S. ENSLIN

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Chester, Pennsylvania

Any serious study of the growth and development of early Christianity can scarcely fail to reveal the almost staggering challenge the followers of the crucified Jesus of Nazareth found themselves confronted with when, pushed against their will from the parental nest, they discovered themselves in the outside world. Not that this Græco-Roman world was religiously bankrupt, as has often been asserted. Many of the older landmarks of the earlier popular religion had crumbled before the criticisms of the philosophers; many men were finding themselves adrift, even as many are today, on an unknown sea without chart or compass, anchors dragging, and with the familiar stars obscured by fog. But that a confirmed and morally vicious atheism had taken the place of an exploded polytheism is no truer than would be a similar diagnosis of present-day society. To gather salacious passages from Persius and Martial, to fail to recognize that Juvenal and Lucian were satirizing and thus deliberately choosing the most repreh-

sible elements available, results in a completely distorted picture. It is easy also to point to Epicureanism and to emphasize that the removal of the gods from an intimate concern with life, and their incarceration in an untroubled limbo of aloofness, must have resulted in an easy-going atheism; that the Stoic identification of the divine with nature could not escape a barren godless rationalism. Mature reading of Epicurus, of Epictetus, of Marcus Aurelius by no means justifies such easy a priori conclusions. The readiness with which the provinces—especially those of Asia Minor, where Christians seem early to have found themselves—had introduced a new goddess, Roma, into their pantheon in grateful appreciation of the coming of peace and security into their troubled world, and had found it most natural to deify her emperors, first the dead and then the living, must not be overlooked. Furthermore, the older hero cults of the Greeks, notably that of Æsculapius, which had been of such significance in the previous centuries,

continued to exert an undiminished influence. And finally, to mention but a few, the so-called mystery cults, both Greek and oriental, were providing the means of escape from present perils to a joyous and certain confidence, and were making converts at a rate which alarmed many a staid Roman. In a word, the Mediterranean world, far from being indifferent or hostile to religion, was showing itself most responsive. The word attributed to Paul in Athens, "Ye men of Athens, in all things I perceive that ye are very religious" (Acts 17: 22), is most apt, whether the word, translated by some "religious," by others "superstitious," be considered a compliment or a reproach. Actually, it was not because the gentiles were indifferent to religion but because they were so incurably religious that Christian missionaries or propagandists found themselves confronted with so great a task.¹

In consequence, they soon discovered that were they to win converts they must speak the language of their hearers. Their ideas as well as their language must be translated. And they were. Never in the history of Christian thought has there been a development so rapid or revolutionary as that which took place in the first few decades after Calvary. To put the matter in a word, had Jesus been able to attend a church service in Corinth, say in the year 54, how astounded he would have been, how he would have shaken his head in amazed perplexity as he went out the door: "Is this the result of those months in Galilee?"!

¹ In this paragraph I have largely followed what I wrote in my *Christian Beginnings* (Harpers, 1938), pp. 186 ff.

A change, yes; but was it for the worse? One thing is very certain: had there been no such change, there would have been no Christianity. Regardless of the intrinsic values of teachings, unless men know them, understand them, they can exert no influence. The revolutionary challenge of Jesus was especially adapted to the Palestine of his day. Had it not been, he would not have sounded it, for if ever a man was the child of his environment, that man was Jesus of Nazareth. But it was a message, in the form in which he announced it, which would have exerted little or no influence on the outside world. The challenge of Jesus, with his insistence on repentance, the impending change which was speedily to come, the judgment and its supernatural judge, the new kingdom momentarily to dawn—all this would have fallen on deaf ears in any other portion of the Mediterranean world than little Palestine. The Greek and the Roman, like Gallio, "cared for none of these things." Salvation, security, hope amid the crumbling ruins—after all these things did the gentiles seek, and avidly.

This the early church came to see: the aims and longings of every human heart were legitimate; it was not necessary for gentiles to banish their hopes and aspirations, their longings and their dreams; the gospel of Christ was broad enough and deep enough to meet and satisfy the longings of every human heart. To no small degree this was the profoundest lesson the early church could have learned. Unfortunately, not all saw it then, just as, unfortunately, all do not see it today. But to no little degree the pew moulded the pulpit then, as it does now, fully as much as the pulpit moulds the pew. Thus as the years went by

the nature of the teaching was ever changing. A saviour god, the Lord Jesus Christ, replaced the prophet of Nazareth, content from the lakeside of Galilee or the thronging streets of Jerusalem to herald God's impending purpose, speedily to be realized; immortality of the released soul replaced resurrection of the tired body; sacraments of a highly effective nature replaced the bodily mutilation which had bound the Jews together as distinct people of a distinct covenant, and the several ceremonial washings which all must experience were they to approach Israel's God. That these developments came speedily to be viewed by non-Christians as distinct borrowing from the rites of other religions is all too clear, as we read the artificial and labored explanation of a Justin Martyr, painfully explaining that early in the world's history the evil demons—spawn of the marriage of the angels of God and the daughters of men—had read in the sacred Scriptures what was destined to be; had seen their power imperiled; had trembled at their coming doom; and had frantically sought to concoct copies of what was to be, so that when the true should appear they might deery it as simple borrowing. We may smile at what seems to us a naïvely ridiculous explanation: it is not so easy to smile away the circumstances that made this naïve explanation seem imperative. And after all the most convincing proof that the new cult did adapt itself to its environment, did provide in understandable and acceptable form the assurance and security that men were questing for, is that, though its claims were contemptuously dismissed, and its insistence that it and it alone could bring the true and only salvation was to result in a baptism not

of water but of blood for many of its adherents, yet within three hundred years from the death of its crucified Lord, it, like him, had overcome the world.

Yet there is another side to the picture. It is perfectly true that at the time when all the writings of the New Testament except the letters of Paul received their final form, Christianity had become essentially a religion of gentiles; yet these earliest Christian teachers and missionaries, Paul included, had been Jews to their finger tips. Though Paul might come to a position where he could term "refuse and loss" those things which he had previously considered of the greatest value, he never lost his essentially Jewish attitude. The Old Testament—Jewish Scripture—was his Bible; its ideals were and remained his ideals. Judaism had been false to its heritage; yet the fact remains that precisely those ideals which he now had come to believe were to be realized only in the Christian and were demanded in consequence of the union of the believer with Christ, rather than through the command of the law, had been held as standards for centuries by the orthodox Jew.

Nor was Paul alone. The Old Testament became the Bible of Christians, and remained such even when in the second century specifically Christian writings came gradually to be read with it and eventually to be added to it. The significance of this Christian adoption of the Old Testament cannot be over-emphasized. Actually the Greek Old Testament—the Septuagint—came to be regarded as essentially the property of Christians, not Jews. Not only was it believed to be full of prophecies of Jesus, the coming Messiah, who thus

could be seen depicted in every page; it was written for Christians, not for Jews. Thus Paul can write to the gentile Christians in Corinth: "Now these things [he had been speaking of the punishments which had come upon the Children of Israel in the wilderness wandering] happened unto them by way of example; and they were written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the ages are come."² In the law of Moses it stands written: "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn."³ But why did God dictate that word? Was it due to concern for the ox? Indeed no; it was to authorize Christian missionaries to expect support from those to whom they preached God's salvation. Hear Paul again: "Is it for the oxen that God careth, or saith he it assuredly for our sake? Yea, for our sake it was written: because he that ploweth ought to plow in hope, and he that thresheth to thresh in the hope of partaking."⁴

This theme, so constantly stressed and so grotesquely emphasized in a Barnabas or Justin Martyr, is no new discovery at the beginning of the second century. Do we not find a direct confirmation that Christians did so think and teach in the fact that the second century saw no less than three new translations of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek for Greek-speaking Jews—those of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion? Small wonder it was that the Jew had come to doubt seriously the accuracy of a version which was being used with such telling effect as a weapon against himself, and that he wanted a version which would be truly his own.

² I Cor. 10: 11.

³ I Cor. 9: 9.

⁴ I Cor. 9: 9-10.

Many Christians thus came quite naturally to feel themselves equipped with a Scripture, admirably calculated as a weapon of defense against both Jew and non-Christian gentile. Many of their ancient prophecies had already been fulfilled; others were being fulfilled daily before the eyes of men, would they but lose their prejudice and look. Christian claims were buttressed thus not alone by contemporary Christian assertions which might be contemptuously dismissed as special pleading. They were guaranteed by being the actual fulfillment of what centuries before had been predicted. That sort of argument worked!

Here in a word is one of the real reasons why Christians were so loath to produce new and distinctly Christian Scriptures; why a Paul when writing to Corinthians or Galatians had no notion that he was adding to Holy Writ; why the materials which had grown up in the course of Christian preaching to the unsaved and which later developed into more or less connected treatises, tracts, gospels—whatever they may be called—were produced primarily for Christian edification; why, when they were produced, they were not regarded as holy or canonical; why, as gradually these several writings, and many more like them, came to be regarded fondly and with growing respect, came to be used as the second century wore along, if not in some cases earlier, in church services, read, as Justin assures us, together with the Scriptures (i.e. the Old Testament), they were yet far from being regarded as on the same plane.

Nor should we forget that it was due to these naïve claims of early Christians to be the real heirs of the Jewish Scriptures, and to the violent and arbi-

trary way they forced these writings upon the Procrustean bed of allegorical exegesis to wrench and extort fancied Messianic prophecies, that we today have the Jewish Scriptures safely bound between black morocco covers as part of our Bibles. Nor should we forget that what is still today the sinew of the Christian gospel, the conviction that morality and religion are indissoluble, if not identical, was a vital note in the early Christian preaching and in no small degree led to Christianity's eventual triumph. As I have said, the picture of moral bankruptcy and religious indifference, so commonly painted of the gentile world at the time of Christianity's advent, seems to me grossly overdone. The teaching of Stoicism and the lives of men like Socrates, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius can never be overlooked, nor should they be explained, as ardent Christians sought, as being actually and proleptically Christian, in so far as they were good! Yet nonetheless, the notion that religion and morality were essentially one; that the religious professions and practices of men of unclean lives, despite the regularity of their initiation, were abhorrent to God and would be dealt with sorely by him—this notion was not native to the Græco-Oriental world, as could be abundantly proved, if we needed a proof of so patent a fact, by the manifest difficulty Paul had in teaching his gentile churches this lesson to him so obvious. Christianity learned many lessons from the outside world, but this is not one of them. For this outlook, at once a source of unmeasured strength and an occasion for constant friction from within, she stood indebted to the Synagogue.

By no means all Christians approved this strong Jewish element. As I have just said, many of Paul's converts—it is especially clear in I Corinthians and Galatians—had seen a distinct *non sequitur* between Paul's insistence that the Jewish law had no authority over men—they were free from the law—and his simultaneous insistence that they must abstain from doing precisely those things which the law forbade. They were apparently quite unable to see—for they were not Jews!—why it was precisely those things which the law forbade that Paul felt were so signally unworthy of the new man in Christ. To them Paul undoubtedly seemed far more of a Jew than he fondly believed himself to be; to them it seemed that he had not made nearly so great a break with his past as he thought and boasted. Thus the complete inconsistency, blandly and blindly disregarded by Paul, between an immediate and complete alteration in the newly born Christian, as a consequence of his mystic union with Christ—his death to the old, his birth to the new; his death to sin, his spirit-filled and spirit-directed life—and his constant carping admonitions and threats, his repeated warnings that every Christian must stand before the judgment bar at the end of the age, was to them painfully evident. It takes little imagination to hear many a Christian asking: "Why? Are we not saved? Have we not been baptized, buried with Christ, crucified with Christ, as you phrase it? Are we not, as you constantly say, 'new men'? Is not the 'old man' dead? Then why, if we are new men, led by the spirit—if our old fleshly wills and natures are dead—why, pray, do we need fear a judgment? We have already passed

from death to life; we have been saved; why need we fear? Why need we be cramped by your unnatural demands? In one breath you tell us we have been set free through Christ; the next moment you seek to enslave us afresh to precisely that from which you say we have been set free." There had probably been many in Paul's day who felt that way. Unless I am quite mistaken, we can still see in the letter to the Galatians clear evidence of the presence of Christians who giped at Paul as one who was simply deluding himself, who was still in bondage to what he fancied he had left. It would certainly seem as if the heated word, "But I, brethren, if I still preach circumcision, why am I still persecuted?"⁵ was addressed in indignant protest to those who were claiming that he *was* (at least by implication) so preaching, not to those who were vehemently condemning him for failing to do that very—and praise-worthy!—thing.

About a hundred years after Paul's death there arose with little warning a most amazing figure, who was destined to convulse Christian thinking as it has rarely been convulsed in its nineteen hundred years; to challenge and repudiate its Scriptures; to cause it in self-defense to raise to canonical rank Christian writings which it had been gradually coming to regard as of value but not as Scripture; to precipitate, in short, such a crisis that not only a Christian Bible but a catholic church resulted. Any man who could do that is surely worthy of attention.

This Martin Luther of the second century—like the later German monk, his point of departure was the Pauline

antithesis between law and grace—was Marcion of Pontus.⁶ Few men of the ancient past have had a sorrier or more unfair appraisal at the hands of history. All our knowledge—and there is a deal more of it than is generally realized—comes from those who bitterly opposed him. Tertullian, the African lawyer and master of caustic invective, devoted a five-book treatise (nearly five hundred pages) to a savage denunciation of his heresy. Since his denunciation was as elaborate as it was savage, it has made immortal what it sought to destroy. (Those whose writings are fated to endure, it may parenthetically be remarked, should beware of what they either praise or condemn!) Justin Martyr, too, produced a treatise against him before his reform was ten years underway. Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Epiphanius all wrote heatedly and at great length, while it is hard to find a father from the second century to the sixth who did not attack with zeal if not with insight. Despite their lurid rhetoric and malignant legends which they passed on they have not been able to disguise the fact that not only did he stand head and shoulders above all the second-century heretics but far surpassed, at least in critical acumen, most of his orthodox contemporaries. And, it may be added in passing, the evidence his opponents

⁶ The classic treatment of Marcion is Harnack's monograph, *Marcion* (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1924). I gladly express my deep indebtedness to this brilliant and exhaustive study. Recently Professor John Knox has published a penetrating volume, *Marcion and the New Testament* (Chicago, 1942). Unfortunately my own essay had been finished before Professor Knox's book appeared. I find myself in substantial and hearty agreement with its main contentions.

⁵ Gal. 5: 11.

have, although unwittingly, preserved affords clear proof of his Christian devotion and his blameless life. He was born in Pontus—many of the writers say in the city of Sinope, on the Black Sea—probably shortly before the end of the first century, perhaps about A.D. 85. Of his early life little is known with definiteness. The story is frequently found that his father was a bishop in Sinope. That there were Jewish groups in Pontus in the time of the early empire is well attested. Mention of Aquila,⁷ the husband of Priscilla, and the other Aquila, the second-century translator of the Old Testament, a Jewish proselyte and according to Epiphanius a native also of Sinope, must suffice. That contact with them may have started his crusade against all Jewish elements in Christianity is possible, but far from sure. After all, his antagonism is not personal but philosophical. Actually the question has been raised whether Marcion may not have been a convert to Christianity from Judaism. That would well account for his detailed familiarity with the Old Testament, his essentially Jewish approach to the Scriptures, especially to Messianic interpretation (so different from the Christian of his day), his resentment against Judaism (the bitterest critic is always the man who was once what he now attacks—he knows where to find the weak spots!), and the similarity in attack upon him and Judaism by such a critic of both as Tertullian. The suggestion is of interest, but, of course, cannot be proved. The story, stemming apparently from Hippolytus and repeated with relish and with a few extra tidbits of scandal by Epi-

phanus, who seems to have surpassed all the other Christian saints (at least of antiquity) in believing the worst of all with whom he differed—and they were legion—and in delighting to attempt the ruin of their reputations, the story that Marcion was excommunicated by his father for having seduced a virgin, can safely be ascribed to pure (or impure) legend arising from his “seduction of the church.” The constant use of the figure “virgin” for the church and the attempts at her “defilement” by heretics is quite sufficient an explanation for the legend. It is perhaps worth while to mention the fact that Tertullian (who entirely omits the legend, as he surely would not have done had he believed it) frequently refers to the ascetic austerity of Marcion’s life and discipline. Nor is it necessary to assume that this later austerity was penitential sackcloth for his own wild oats.

Presumably Marcion had been excluded from the Pontic church before he left for the province of Asia and Rome. The fact that he carried letters (apparently of recommendation), if we can believe the reference to him in the prologue of three Latin gospel manuscripts,⁸ together with the speedy difficulties which he experienced in Ephesus, and probably in Smyrna and Hierapolis as well, suggests that he had already started his Jewish purge while still in Pontus, that his excommunication at home had made some stir, and that he already had a following.

From Asia Minor he went to Rome “in his own ship”—he apparently was

⁷ Acts 18: 2.

⁸ “*Is vero scripta vel epistolas pertulerat ad eum a fratribus qui in Ponto fuerunt.*” Cf. Wordsworth and White, *N. T. Latine*, pp. 490 f.

a shipowner and a man of no little wealth. He is said to have given the Roman church 200,000 sesterces upon his arrival. Later, after he had fallen into disfavor this was returned.⁹ That he had sent to Rome from Asia Minor a female disciple to prepare the way is asserted by Jerome.¹⁰ That this statement is due to confusion with the Marcellina whom both Irenæus and Epiphanius say acted as advance agent for Valentinus is to me probable. His open breach came in 144—that date is apparently fixed by the fact that his followers set an interval of 115 years, six and a half months between him and Jesus.¹¹ Since this obviously could not refer to his birth, it may well suggest the date he broke away from orthodoxy. The exactness of the date suggests the birthday of the reform church. Underlying the story told by Hippolytus of his debate with the Christian elders in Rome over the meaning of Luke 6: 43—"the good tree and the bad fruit"—and the nonsensical additions by Epiphanius, who pictures him as irate with the Roman church for not electing him its bishop, although they had refused already to reinstate him in membership because of his carnal sin, and his dashing out from the council, as Cataline had from the Roman senate, with the roar of defiance, "I will rend your church and cast schism therein for ever!" may well lie a sober historical fact. After a residence of perhaps five years in Rome the breach came; the remainder of his life he spent, as had his hero Paul, in traveling about from Rome as a base, preaching and founding

churches. His early success is attested by Justin, writing only a few years after his breach:

And as we said before, the demons put forth Marcion of Pontus, who is even now teaching men to deny that God is the maker of all things in heaven and on earth, and that the Christ predicted by the prophets is his Son, and preaches another God besides the creator of all, and likewise another Son. And many have believed this man, as if he alone knew the truth, and laugh at us, though they have no proof of what they say, but are carried away irrationally as lambs by a wolf, and become the prey of atheistical doctrines, and of demons.¹²

Perhaps this caustic and bitter word of Justin will serve as a convenient starting point for a quick survey of the views of this man, whom Jerome freely admitted was "fervent in spirit" and "highly learned in the Scriptures" (*ardens ingenii . . . et doctissimus*).

We will fail utterly to understand Marcion unless we see him as a zealous and devoted Christian who refused to give up his dream of bringing the whole church back to the pure gospel which he believed had been seriously corrupted and mutilated. The antitheses which Paul had drawn between law and gospel had for the most part become of little concern to most Christians of the second century. To Marcion they were central. He, doughty champion of Paul that he was, must pick up the mantle laid down by Paul and deliver Christianity from the evils which had come in consequence of the Jewish doctrines which had crept in—or had been dragged in. In a word, his aim was to bring to the fore the Pauline gospel, for Paul alone among the early apostles had been able rightly to understand the blessed salvation announced by Christ.

⁹ Tertullian, *de Praescript.* 30; *adv. Marc.* iv, 4.

¹⁰ *Ep.* 133, 4.

¹¹ Tertullian, *adv. Marc.* i, 19.

¹² Justin M., *Apol.* i, 58, 1 f.

It was this insistence, "Back to Christ and Paul," which led him to reject all the other Christian writings. To be sure, he introduces a distinctly doctetic element—perhaps he is here dependent upon his teacher, Cerdo, though that is to me far from certain—but in most of his views he was poles apart from the Gnostics of the second century. Not knowledge (*γνῶσις*), couched in mystic and cryptic terms intended solely for the elect, but faith (*πίστις*) was the basis on which salvation was to be obtained; and, more than that, it was open to all. To that end he devoted his life, even as had Paul, although the unsympathetic Ephrem the Syrian saw a closer resemblance to Cain the wanderer. He has been charged with adding alien elements. Perhaps he did, although the evidence to me is far from clear; if he did, it was unconsciously. His sole aim was to bring to light once more the revelation which Christ had brought and which Paul alone had rightly appraised, not to create; to purge away accretions, not to add new values.

His point of departure, as is hinted by the story told by Hippolytus, was apparently Luke 6: 43—"For there is no good tree that bringeth forth corrupt fruit; nor again a corrupt tree that bringeth forth good fruit." The God of the Jewish Scriptures who could say, "I will create evil,"¹³ could not himself be good; nor was he the Supreme Intelligence: he could not find Adam when the latter hid from him. He was the creator of the universe (*ὁ δημιουργός*), but he was not the God whom Jesus had come to reveal; not the God whom Paul had preached. Thus his startling point of cleavage for orthodox Christianity was his denial of unity to the First

Principle; his insistence that there were two gods, a just God depicted in the Jewish Scriptures who could demand "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," and a good God completely unknown not only to men but to the demiurge himself until Jesus had descended from heaven to reveal him. This hitherto unknown God could say, "To him that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer also the other." The true God, the hitherto undivulged God of love, who is himself goodness and love and who desires love and faith from men, was thus totally other than the wrathful, jealous, and capricious God of the Jewish Scriptures, who demanded from his worshipers not love and faith but fear and obedience couched in terms of outward righteousness.

It is easy to criticize this radical, if not reckless, dualism. Had Marcion possessed a critical understanding of the development of Old Testament teachings and the relationship in which Jesus and the gospel stood to Judaism, he could hardly have reached the extreme he did. To no little degree, it appears to me, the emphasis upon the timelessness and fixity of revelation, i.e. the impossibility of an economy of revelation, which Christianity had taken over dutifully from Judaism—how can there be such a thing as progress in any religion which takes itself seriously as a religion of revelation?—led Marcion to view the chasm as impassable. He saw two gods in hopeless juxtaposition; yet he did not believe that he was inventing this dualism: he was simply carrying on the same antinomy of Paul's, of Jesus'.

In his entirety—body, soul, spirit—man was the slave of the wrathful creator who had formed him from material

¹³ Isa. 45: 7; Amos 3: 6.

(ὅλη) and had laid upon him a law which he was utterly powerless to keep. As a consequence, in sheer inability and helplessness the whole race fell under the curse of this demiurge. Fortunately the curse was only temporary. The true God, hitherto unknown, as I have said, not alone to men but to the creator himself, suddenly revealed himself in pity and sent, as a manifestation of himself, his son to redeem the wretched race enslaved to its harsh taskmaster. Needless to say, this figure was totally unheralded in the Jewish Scriptures. The anointed of the Lord referred to by the prophets, Marcion properly saw, since he was utterly averse to the fantastic and crude Messianic interpretation of orthodox Christianity, was a deliverer of the Jews, an earthly king, a man of war. The true Christ, the son of the hitherto unknown but eternally existent God, in a visionary body, in appearance a man of thirty, appeared at Capernaum (of course, from heaven) in the fifteenth year of Tiberius. None of the Jews recognized or understood him. His own followers failed utterly to recognize his true nature, but in their blindness hailed him as the child of the demiurge who had been foreseen by the prophets as destined to establish a Jewish empire. Even yet the demiurge failed to recognize the true Christ, but in anger had him nailed to a tree, since he had been upbraided by the Christ for having acted in a manner contrary to his own law. The crucifixion sealed the doom of the demiurge: he was forced to deliver up the souls of those who were to be redeemed to the good God. Thus these are in truth to be seen as purchased by the death of Christ. This note appears central to Marcion. Indignantly Epiphanius accuses Marcion

of twisting the word of the apostle (of course he refers to Gal. 3: 3) by substituting ἡγόρασεν (bought) for ἐξηγόρασεν (redeemed). Thus Marcion had argued: Since Christ *bought* us we were not originally his, for one does not buy what is his own; he bought us with his life (his only commodity) from the alien demiurge who had owned us.¹⁴ After proceeding to the underworld to deliver the spirits of the dead—Epiphanius¹⁵ says he delivered Cain, Korah, Dathan, Abiram, Esau, and all the gentiles who had not known the Jewish God, but left the other worthies there who had served the demiurge and had not waited for the invisible God—Christ had raised up Paul as his apostle. He in turn had carried on, the only one able to distinguish between the demiurge and the good God and thus to appreciate the genuine gospel of Christ. Despite unceasing opposition from the original apostles he had founded churches of true Christians. But his opponents soon gained the upper hand. The gospel of Christ became mutilated and garbled in spurious gospels. Even the letters of Paul suffered a similar fate. Finally Marcion had been raised up, as Paul had been before him, to undo this chaos, to sound once more the true gospel, to lead, as Luther fourteen centuries later was to do, the church from its Babylonian captivity.

Thus, of course, Marcion was irrevocably opposed to any Jewish note in Christianity. The Old Testament, which until his day had been the sole authoritative and inspired Scripture for Christians, was rejected *in toto*. In its place he took as a nucleus the ten letters of

¹⁴ Epiphanius, *Panarion* 42, 8.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, 42, 4, 1-4.

Paul which he considered genuine, arranged (at least in part) in the order of their apparent anti-Jewishness—Galatians, I and II Corinthians, Romans, I and II Thessalonians, Laodiceans (Ephesians), Colossians, Philippians, and Philemon.¹⁶ It is probable that he subjected them to some sort of editing to prune out the too favorable references to Judaism, which he believed had been interpolated by Jewish Christians during the years, and thus to restore them to their pristine form. The Pastoral Epistles he did not include, probably because of his sound belief that they were not from the pen of Paul. It has occasionally been suggested that the Pastorals were not known to Marcion but were actually written later to combat his influence.¹⁷

Furthermore he rejected what he considered the spurious gospels, purged the

¹⁶ Tertullian and Epiphanius disagree as to the order of the last two, the latter placing Philemon before Philippians. Knox (*op. cit.*, pp. 42 ff.) accepts Epiphanius' order and conjectures that just as the letters to Corinth and those to Thessalonica were grouped to form two items, so probably Philemon was grouped with Colossians. Thus Knox argues that the only change in order made by Marcion was to place Galatians at the head of the list. This order which Marcion substantially adopted had been determined by their comparative lengths. This suggestion of Knox is attractive. (Cf. his earlier article, "A Conjecture as to the Original Status of II Corinthians and II Thessalonians in the Pauline Canon"—*Journal of Biblical Literature* LV [1936], pp. 145-153.) Epiphanius, however, is a very uncertain reed on which to lean. Though he speaks of the "ten" letters, he lists Laodiceans as the "eleventh" and ascribes Eph. 4: 5 to it (*Panarion*, 42, 11, 8).

¹⁷ This was the view of F. C. Baur. It has recently been advocated by several scholars—Riddle, Goodspeed, Rist, and Knox. Despite Harnack's pronouncement—"ist längst widerlegt"—it appears to me far from impossible.

true one, our Luke, of its accretions and Jewish interpolations, notably the birth story, and sought to restore it to its original form. It would seem that in its "purified" form it began: "In the fifteenth year of Tiberius, Jesus Christ [or God?] came down to Capernaum, a city of Galilee, and taught in the synagogue." To what extent his text differed from the one he had inherited is not easily said. It would appear to have been simply an abridgement, with very little actual interpolation by Marcion himself. Frequent attempts at reconstruction of Marcion's gospel have been made. It would be impossible to review the results in any detail here. Frequent guesses as to why Marcion selected Luke as the one best embodying the primitive gospel have been made. Obviously Matthew would have been unacceptable; John, which Marcion presumably knew, would have contained some highly acceptable material—"All that came before me are thieves and robbers"¹⁸—but such material as its prologue, the high appraisal by John, Cana of Galilee—to mention but a few incidents—was hopeless. On the other hand, he must have *one* gospel, for one gospel, like the Pauline epistles, must have been genuine although (unfortunately) doctored up by the Jews and Jewish Christians against whom Paul had fought. Only Mark and Luke would thus seem to have been prominent enough to come into choice. Perhaps the scanty amount of discourse material in Mark tended to weigh the balance in favor of Luke. Yet it is not impossible that in Pontus the Gospel of Luke had been the one in orthodox use, and thus the one to which Marcion had

¹⁸ John 10: 8.

become accustomed.¹⁹ It is surely probable that in the early days before collections of gospels began to appear few, if any, churches had more than one gospel. The titles of the gospels, obviously no earlier than the time of their collection, were to him inconsequential, if known. Thus it is not surprising that his gospel bore no title save "Gospel." This aroused the ire of Tertullian: "Marcion . . . ascribes no author to his gospel, as if it would not be allowed him to affix a title to that from which it was no crime to subvert the very body!"²⁰

On the other hand, his *apostolicon*—the ten Pauline letters which he had accepted as genuine—required distinguishing titles. It is of interest to note that the earliest prologues to the Pauline letters which we possess are of Marcionite origin, whether from his own pen or from that of his early followers. They are extant in many Latin manuscripts. Two of them may be cited, to reveal their general nature:

The Galatians are Greeks. At first they received the word of truth from the apostle but after his departure were tempted by false apostles to make use of the law and of circumcision. The apostle summons them back to faith, writing to them from Ephesus.

The Colossians also, like the Laodiceans [Colossians, it will be remembered, followed Laodiceans, i.e. Ephesians, in Marcion's *apostolicon*], are Asians. They too had been hampered by false apostles, nor did he reach

them, but corrected them by a letter; for they had heard the word from Archippus, who had received their ministry. Therefore the apostle, now in chains, wrote them from Ephesus.²¹

To what extent he edited this *apostolicon* is uncertain. That he subjected the several letters to some sort of pruning is asserted by all his critics—notably Tertullian—and is not impossible. Of course, his purpose was to restore what Paul had written, not to remove any Pauline word. Many of the alleged Marcionite "alterations" are actually attested by manuscripts, and thus are scarcely to be regarded as Marcionite alterations at all, but simply variants which had arisen in the second century. Nor are all the so-called "Marcionite excisions" to be regarded as due to his knife. What we really need is a genuinely critical, i.e. non-ecclesiastical, text of the *corpus paulinarum*.

Since Marcion felt that Paul was in distinct conflict with the other apostles, ample confirmation of which he thought he found in the Pauline letters (notably Galatians), it is not surprising that he disregarded those of the so-called Catholic epistles which he might have chanced to know, and also Acts. At the time the several gospels were being collected to form a *gospel*—probably this tendency had started rather before the time of Marcion's independent activity²²—of necessity the second half of the "writing to Theophilus," our Acts, had been separated from the "gospel." The emphasis in the early half of what we call

¹⁹ Knox (*op. cit.*) argues that Marcion did not know our Luke but instead used an "early Luke" or a "proto-Luke" (though not the "proto-Luke" of Streeter). Sometime after Marcion this "early" Luke was revised and combined with other material to form our Luke-Acts. His arguments are not lightly to be dismissed, for some of the evidence he has presented raises insistent questions which must be considered in detail in subsequent work on Luke-Acts.

²⁰ *Adv. Marc.* iv, 2.

²¹ It is interesting to observe that I and II Corinthians and I and II Thessalonians receive but one prologue each (cf. note 16). Later prologues were written by catholic Christians for II Corinthians, II Thessalonians, the omitted Pastorals, and the order was changed.

²² Cf. my *Christian Beginnings*, pp. 459 ff.

Acts on the other apostles may well have seemed to Marcion to overbalance any mistaken enthusiasm for Paul that the latter half contained. At any rate, he totally disregarded it. In addition to his *apostolicon* and *gospel* he appears to have composed a writing of his own which his followers highly prized. This apparently was styled the *Antitheses*. In it he argued by a series of antithetical passages, prominent among which were almost certainly Luke 6: 43 and 5: 36 f.—“the good tree and evil fruit,” “the old wine skins and the new wine”—that the Old Testament was not only in such hopeless conflict with the Christian writings that no compromise could be made, but that it was in constant contradiction with itself. That this writing was regarded highly by Marcion’s followers is evidenced by Tertullian’s irate word: “What if they do not acknowledge the letter? [Tertullian is here referring to a letter which he argued proved Marcion had once supported the faith he later denied.] They, at any rate, receive his *Antitheses*; and more than that, they make ostentatious use of them.”²³ Tertullian, Irenæus, Origen, and Ephrem apparently had seen this work. Other opponents of Marcion, as Jerome, Epiphanius, Adamantius, and Eznik, had not.²⁴

This Pauline gospel, as he conceived it, he proclaimed in full confidence that he was most loyally following in the steps of his great hero and proclaiming the gospel of the true God whom his Son had come to earth to reveal. Men must renounce their allegiance to the demiurge; instead must centre their faith in the good God and his crucified Son. By this act of faith, if it be approved by

good works of love—like Paul, Marcion demanded a zealous conformity of life to belief—they will be saved, although their bodies, being mortal, will perish. As I have suggested, his teaching was thoroughly dualistic. Men must flee all contact with the demiurge and his works, must scrupulously avoid all that was sensual. Marriage especially was to be shunned. A rigorous asceticism was to be practised, in which all extravagances of food and dress were to be avoided. Meat and wine were forbidden. In the communion meal water was substituted for wine.²⁵

Marcion died at the height of his influence. The exact date of his death is unknown, but was probably not far from A.D. 160. Many early writers emphasize that Marcion’s activity was during the days of Anicetus, bishop in Rome *ca.* 154–165. Nothing of his death is known. Tertullian, to be sure, in an earlier work refers to a reputed recantation: “Marcion, afterwards, indeed, professed repentance, and agreed to the conditions granted him—that he should receive reconciliation if he restored to the church all the others whom he had been training for perdition; he was prevented, however, by death.”²⁶ This statement may safely be regarded as utterly valueless. No other writer mentions it; Tertullian himself fails to repeat it in his fuller volume of attack. It is the ageless story told of all heretics, be they a Marcion, a Robert Ingersoll, or a Charles Darwin; archheretics always commit suicide or have a deathbed conversion.

After his death his disciples contin-

²³ A practice (either Marcion’s or earlier heretics’) which would appear to underlie the protest in I Tim. 5: 23.

²⁶ *De Præscript.* 30.

²³ *Adv. Marc.* iv, 4.

²⁴ Cf. Harnack, *op. cit.*, pp. 76 f.

ued his activity, apparently in four groups or sects. They proved formidable both in numbers and in strictness of life. To meet their menace was one of the real incentives to an organized orthodox front—the birth of the catholic church. They, like their teacher, were ascetics, forbidding marriage and the use of wine and meat. They seem to have been a noble and honest group, scorning subterfuge and comparing very favorably with the orthodox in providing martyrs for their faith. Frequent mention is still to be found of their dying in the same persecutions, often on the same pyres, with other Christians. Their severity of life is indicated by the ironic gibes leveled at them. Tertullian thus inquires sarcastically:

Come, then, if you do not fear God as being good, why do you not boil over into every kind of lust, and so realize that which is, I believe, the main enjoyment to all who fear not God? Why do you not frequent the customary pleasures of the maddening circus, the bloodthirsty arena, and the lascivious theatre? Why in persecution also do you not, when the censor is presented, at once redeem your life by the denial of your faith? "God forbid," you say with redoubled emphasis. So you do fear sin, and by your fear prove that he is an object of fear who forbids the sin.²⁷

Quite unconsciously, in these revealing words, Tertullian has brought poignant testimony to their character, and shows that apparently, although he could not understand it, their refusal to fear their God who, as Tertullian indignantly protests, "never inflicts punishment, who has prepared no fire in hell, no gnashing of teeth in the outer darkness . . . who is simply good,"²⁸ did not undermine their character.

²⁷ *Adv. Marc.* i, 37.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

It is easy to overstress their deviation from orthodoxy: their utter rejection of the Old Testament; their denial of God's work in creation; their disregard for many of the Christian writings, destined to be canonized, in no small part, precisely because they and their teacher had denied them. There was much to applaud. Their belief in a good God who was to be loved and worshiped without fear appeared quixotic to a Tertullian; the very title "God" to him suggested the absurdity: "Foolish man, do you say that he whom you call Lord ought not to be feared, while the very title you give him indicates power which must itself be feared?"²⁹ Yet actually this confidence was in no small measure due to their belief that he had revealed himself in Christ for the sake of mankind. And for that faith, quite apart from a fear of consequences, un compelling as it might appear to their critics, they were ready in gratitude to die. Nor do they seem to have been overcontentious. No record of any bitter words of Marcion or his followers to compare with those of their critics are known to me. Apelles, one of Marcion's disciples, as an old man, is said by Eusebius³⁰ to have refused to debate with his critic Rhodo, on the ground that faith in the Crucified would suffice for the salvation of both, without change of views, if they persisted in a holy life.

After the persecution of Diocletian (284–305) they seem to have had a breathing spell. As soon, however, as Christianity was established as the religion of the empire, they were deprived of freedom of worship. One of the

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Hist. Eccl.* v, 13, 5.

earliest church inscriptions known (ca. A.D. 318) is of a Marcionite church in the Syrian village of Lebaboi: "Congregation (συναγωγή) of Marcionites of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by the providence of Paul, in the villages of Lebaboi, year 630 [Seleucid era]." It is not without interest to observe that despite the anti-Jewish attitude of the Marcionites the designation *synagogê* was employed. According to Eusebius,³¹ Constantine forbade their meeting both in public and private. Their churches were to be handed over to the orthodox body, while any private houses discovered being used for schismatic purposes were to be confiscated. Despite restrictions, however, they appear to have persisted, although in declining numbers. Theodoret, in the fifth century, claims to have converted more than a thousand. Their decline and eventual disappearance would seem to have been in consequence not of persecutions nor of restrictions but of the inroads made by oriental dualism, notably Manichæism. Even as late as the tenth century evidence of their existence is to be found.

It is no longer possible to disregard Marcion as but one of a bothersome horde of Gnostic fanatics who produced their verbose and labored mythology of æons, and not infrequently showed their contempt for the detestable body by their flagrant violations of the ordinary decencies of life. Marcion may have acquired some Gnostic flavor—doctetic he seems to have been—but he was essentially different. His complete freedom from cant, allegorization, sophistry, and muddleheaded syncretism is not to be overlooked. It is even doubtful if

Marcion would have leveled the broadsides he did at the Old Testament had it not been for the Christian allegorization of it, which may well have seemed to his critical insight utterly vicious and perverse, certainly grotesquely absurd. As I have tried to suggest, he did not regard the Old Testament as a book of lies. It was true history; it was what had happened. It was to be eschewed not because it was untrue but because it was evil. His critical faculties may have been, probably they were, distinctly limited by his day and generation; he did, despite his devotion to it, turn the Pauline gospel upside down by his denial that the God of redemption was the same as the God of creation. To that extent he merited Harnack's famous quip: "It may be said that in the second century only one Christian—Marcion—took the trouble to understand Paul; but it must be added that he misunderstood him." One is, nevertheless, aware that he is in the presence of a great man, and an honest man. It is a pity there was not a place for him in the church he loved.

Yet after all, had there been a place, there would have been a vastly different story for the early church. As I have tried to point out, until Marcion's advent Jewish Scripture, our Old Testament, had remained the sole Scripture for Christians. To be sure, Christian writings had been slowly but surely growing in favor. It is very probable that the gospels and the letters of Paul were coming to be read in the Christian services as providing valuable information and instruction. But without a jolt this situation might well have continued for decades unchanged. Marcion supplied the jolt. The canonical Scriptures were challenged. In their

³¹ *De Vita Const.* iii, 64.

place were put precisely these distinctly Christian writings which were coming to occupy so dear a place in Christian hearts. And this was done by a heretic! The mine was sprung. A scandalized orthodoxy, awake at last to its weakness—its divided front, its numerous camps of independent generals—found itself in a distinctly awkward position: It must defend its hallowed Scriptures before the attack of the heretic; on the other hand, how could it give a lower estimate to its own distinctly Christian writings, produced by its own heroes, than had this shameless Pontic mouse?³² Had Marcion's new canon been simply composed of his own writings, it might have been contemptuously dismissed. But his choice of writings already highly esteemed made the matter vastly more serious. Though they could not afford to ignore or deny the writings which Marcion had selected, they found their answer at hand: Not only had he perversely rejected the Scriptures, prophetic on every page of the Christ he wickedly disregarded for another, but he had also dishonored and misused even those writings which he professed to revere. He had shamefully mutilated the letters of Paul, and with them and an emasculated Luke was seeking to attack true Christians with their own writings and, worse, blaspheme God and his Christ. Naturally the very writings

which he had denied and dismembered must become for outraged orthodoxy weapons for defense and offense. Thus, of course, Tertullian restricts himself in large measure to the Gospel of Luke and these ten letters of Paul as an arsenal against Marcion.

A common front, as I have said, was necessary. A common foe required a common answer. The faith once for all delivered to the saints was under fire; all must rally to its support. Any lingering preference for a living voice as against written books, which conservative Christians may still have felt, had to yield ground. Distrust of the union of the several written gospels, which may well have seemed to some Christians simply the effort to let one of them ride into popularity on the crest of the others, waned. In this union was the God-given answer to him who would have put asunder what God had joined together.

Is it too much to say that in this discovery both the canon and the catholic church were born? No man responsible for this is negligible. Orthodoxy has always viewed heretics askance, has been ready to agree with Origen that the most dangerous heretics are those whose lives are good.³³ Not infrequently it has received its greatest and most lasting blessings from them. Perhaps never has this been more conspicuously true than in the case of Marcion of Pontus.

³² "What Pontic mouse ever had such gnawing powers as he who has gnawed the gospels to pieces?" (Tertullian, *adv. Marc.* i, 1.)

³³ *Ezek. Hom.* vii.

THE OLD TESTAMENT AND A THEOLOGY FOR TODAY

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It has often been said of our Puritan ancestors that their religion was too much a religion of one Testament, the Old. If that is true, it is at least equally true that the religion of our day is also too much a religion of one Testament, the New. One sees this at its worst in the lunatic fringe of the Protestant Church in Germany which frankly rejects the Old Testament as being in any sense the Word of God. We Anglo-Saxons are not likely to follow logic so rigorously. We prefer to allow unpalatable doctrines to fall quietly into desuetude. And the Old Testament has largely fallen into desuetude. How shall we account for this? Partly it is because we have reacted to the excessive devotion paid the Hebrew Scriptures by former generations. This reaction was encouraged by the new critical and scientific view of the scriptures which brought an immense sense of relief to many thoughtful people. There were so many uncomfortable things they no longer had to believe. The Sermon on the Mount, the 13th chapter of First Corinthians, the First Epistle of St. John—here they found all that a man really needed to believe in order to be a Christian. For many, the Old Testament became merely a foil to demonstrate the superiority of the New. An Old Testament God of wrath was set in contrast to a New Testament God of love; an Old Testament ethic of justice and law was set in contrast to a New

Testament ethic of mercy and freedom. This contrast seems so attractive to people of genuine spiritual and ethical sensitivity, anxious to redeem the Church from things outworn, that they are likely to forget that precisely in this contrast between the theology of the Old and that of the New Testament lay the essence of one of the earliest of Christian heresies, that of Marcion. And we might well remember that it was to this same Marcion that St. Polycarp replied, one day in Rome, when asked by the heretic, "Dost thou recognize me?" "Yes, I recognize thee, thou first-born of Satan!"

If this is a partial explanation of our present depreciation of the Old Testament, another reason is a certain sense of confusion which has been created by the achievements of modern scholarship. There has always been confusion, of course, in the minds of lay people, since the Old Testament is an enormous and frequently baffling book. But it is not this confusion on the part of the laity to which I particularly refer. It is rather to the confusion aroused in the minds of our clergy by the brief exposure to a critical view of the scriptures which most of them receive in the Seminary. In many respects, one must envy the men of a former generation. Then, everything was comparatively simple. Then one stood upon the impregnable rock of Holy Scripture and one's only problem was that of acquiring familiar-

ity with its contents. Such certainty is not available to the student today, nor has it been, I imagine, to most of us. Unfortunately, but little time can be devoted to the Old Testament in the Seminary curriculum, and much of that must be spent in the ground work, which is a necessary preface to the understanding of the scriptures, but does not in itself produce that understanding. Intrinsically interesting as much of this work is, it contributes little or nothing to the religious thinking of the student and often leaves him with a sense that the Old Testament is a perplexing farrago of interesting stories for children, dreary compilations of obsolete statutes, revolting accounts of ancient atrocities committed in the name of Yahweh, pessimistic, if largely unintelligible, oracles of misanthropic prophets (who may or may not have been the people they were supposed to be), and pious legends about people who may or may not have existed—all of this slightly alleviated by occasional gleams of religious or ethical insight which might be worth pursuing, if one had the time! This is, of course, an exaggerated picture, but, at least in caricature, it does represent that sense of confusion about the nature and the value of the Old Testament which helps to explain our present lack of appreciation for it. How refreshing it seems to turn from such bewildering and often repugnant material, and from such thorny problems, to the beautiful clarity of the Gospels and the less theological portions of the New Testament Epistles!

There is yet a third reason for the current neglect of the Old Testament scriptures, and this is one for which Old Testament scholarship is largely responsible. Old Testament scholarship, in

this generation, has not been primarily concerned with the religious values of the Bible. To an extent which is not possible in New Testament studies, Old Testament scholarship has become secularized. For many students, Old Testament scholarship has become little more than a particular branch of Semitic philology, of Near Eastern archæology, or of ancient history, with no particular relevance either for living religion or for the common life. It is rare to find an Old Testament scholar today who is a theologian, who regards Old Testament studies not as a branch of history or linguistics, but rather as a branch of that queen of the sciences whose proper subject is the knowledge of God. Unquestionably this secularization of Biblical studies has contributed in no small measure to the popular lack of interest in the Old Testament, for Old Testament scholarship has been remote from the life of common men who wait for the living God. Do not misunderstand my point. The hard, exacting disciplines of linguistics, archæology and historical science are indispensable to any Biblical scholarship which is worthy of the name. But they are not ends in themselves. They need to be seen in a broader perspective, as means by which we can see more clearly the working of God in history and hear the voice of Moses' God speaking to us today. Perhaps it takes a poet rather than a scholar to do that. Certainly one can not read such novels as Thomas Mann's *Joseph cycle*, or Franz Werfel's *Hearken unto the Voice*, without feeling that these authors deal with things which are universal and eternal. However one does not really need to be a poet or a literary giant to treat the Old Testament as if it is the word of God

and as if it really does have something to say to humanity. Indeed, there already seems to be a reaction setting in amongst scholars. As an encouraging example, one could quote the concluding words of the most significant and widely-discussed book in recent years in the Old Testament field, Dr. Albright's *From the Stone Age to Christianity*: "We need reawakening of faith in the God of the majestic theophany on Mt. Sinai, in the God of Elijah's vision at Horeb, in the God of the Jewish exiles in Babylonia, in the God of the Agony at Gethsemane."

That sentence forms a fitting transition to the topic with which I wish to deal, namely, what relevance does the Old Testament have to a theology for today? Are Moses, Elijah, Ezekiel, the compilers of the Priestly Code, the Wise Men and the others, simply interesting figures from another age to be dissected and analyzed with scholarly detachment, or are they the possessors of a vital faith which, in its essence, is communicable to us today?

One of the first steps that must be taken is to overcome that excessive sense of contrast between the Old and New Testaments, and to recover a sense of their essential unity. We have stressed altogether too much the contrast between the Old and the New in ethics and theology, as though things must be stated in terms of "either—or" rather than of "more and less." There is very little that is wholly original in the religious or moral teaching of Jesus. His originality as a teacher consists in arrangements and emphasis, and the making explicit of that which is already implicit. The first of the two great commandments, as we all know, is simply a portion of the Shema, the es-

sential creed of Judaism. The golden rule, in a negative form at least, was spoken by the Rabbi Hillel who, in turn, simply borrowed it from the fourth chapter of the Book of Tobit. The New Testament teaching with regard to the forgiveness of enemies is nowhere more beautifully expressed than in the familiar passage in Proverbs 25: 21, "If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat; if he be thirsty, give him water to drink." Does the New Testament alone preach the Fatherhood of God? We hardly need to be reminded of that passage in Hosea (740 B.C.) in which Yahweh yearns over His people and poignantly recalls to them his mercies, "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt. I taught Israel to walk. I took them in my arms, and they knew not that I healed them." Or the 103rd Psalm, "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear Him." Is it only in the New Testament that religion bursts the bonds of nationalism and becomes a catholic faith? Eight centuries before Paul shook off the dust of Judaism and turned to the Gentiles, Amos, the first of the literary prophets, ridiculed the exclusive pretensions of the Jews, "Are ye not as the children of the Ethiopians unto me, O children of Israel? saith Yahweh. Have I not brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt and the Philistines from Caphtor and the Syrians from Kir?" An excessive simplification of the Christian faith has sometimes made its uniqueness consist in the doctrines of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man, and yet these particular doctrines have never been more perfectly phrased nor more persuasively expressed than in the book of

Malachi (2: 10), "Have we not all one Father? hath not one God created us? why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother, profaning the covenant of our fathers?"

It is true, of course, that Jesus remarked on the contrast between what had been said of old time and that which "I say unto you." Yet, in most of these judgments, he was simply underlining things which the mind and conscience of Judaism *at its best* had already accepted. The religion which He taught is the distilled essence of the highest and best in Old Testament religion, and as such His moral and theological teaching would have found ready understanding among the people of His own day. We need to remember this, because it reminds us that we can understand His teaching only as we see it against the background of the Old Testament scriptures, and of contemporary Judaism. The New Testament does not mark a violent break in history, the sudden incursion into the stream of things of something totally new. It is the culmination of an historical process, the opening of the last page of a continuous story. Christ did not come as a meteor blazing across a dark sky. His appearance was rather like the final appearance of the sun after the long, quiet hours of the dawn. It is so that God works in nature as well as in history. Little as even biologists know about the actual processes of evolution, it seems evident that it does not come through violent discontinuities but through the quiet emergence of qualities hitherto implicit, through new and original combinations of characters already present.

That which was and is new in Christianity is not primarily its theology or

its ethics, but the simple assertion that the promises of the Old Testament have been fulfilled. So Jesus begins His ministry with the proclamation, "The time is fulfilled; the Kingdom of God is at hand. Believe in this good news." The miracles which Jesus wrought were signs of His Messiahship, and were accomplished with the powers of the new Messianic kingdom which had already begun. "If I by the Spirit of God cast out demons, then is the Kingdom of God come upon you." And it was for this they rejected and crucified Him. His rejection was not due, as the liberal theologians of the last generation supposed, to the preaching of a revolutionary doctrine about the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. Nor was He rejected, as preachers of the Social Gospel sometimes seem to teach, because of His deep compassion for the poor and His abhorrence of wealth. Both these elements in His teaching are deeply rooted in the soil of Old Testament religion. In these things, He spoke as had the prophets before Him. He was rejected because He claimed to fulfill in His own person the great promises of the Old Testament and because He proclaimed that the Kingdom of God was not only immediately imminent, but, in some wonderful and mysterious way, had already entered as an objective factor into the processes of history. He was crucified, as the Gospel narrative makes abundantly clear, because He made the claim which was ironically set above His head, "This Jesus of Nazareth is the King of the Jews." And He accepted that death gladly, because He believed that, by His death, He was inaugurating the New Covenant between God and Man which had been promised by Jeremiah. This

we, too, believe. The Old Testament therefore can really be understood only as one views it from the vantage point of the New, as certainly as the New can be understood only as one sees it against the background of the Old. It has sometimes been suggested that the Old Testament is good enough for the Jews and us, but that in the mission fields it might be better to substitute something else, for instance in India the *Rig-Veda* and the *Upanishads*; in China, the *Analects* of Confucius; perhaps for Mohammedans, the *Koran*; each of these being considered as introductory and preparatory to the New Testament. Such a procedure would violate the fundamental dogma of the Christian faith, which is, that while God has provided a light for every man that entereth into the world, yet He gave to the world a complete and final revelation of Himself in a definite historic process which began with the children of Israel in the shadow land of pre-historic times and culminated in the Incarnation and in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ our Lord. The Bible is the record of that majestic history and, for the understanding of that history, there is no part of the Bible which can be considered irrelevant. The Old Testament breathes hope and expectation. The New Testament breathes the confident assurance that all things have been fulfilled. The separate threads of the Old Testament converge toward a point which lies beyond its horizon. In the New Testament, one sees the point at which these separate lines converge. Each is essentially unintelligible without the other.

So, for a modern Christology and a modern Theology, the Old Testament is of indispensable importance. Today, we can no longer give credence to the

Jesus of 19th century liberal thought—the Jesus of Schleiermacher, Strauss, or Renan—Jesus the philosopher, the ethical teacher, the prophet of a gently optimistic kindliness. Nor can we accept the Jesus of Schweitzer and the Catholic modernists—the Jesus of eschatology, the tragic and mistaken prophet of the immediate end of everything. The character of Jesus is far too complex to be explained in terms of any simple formula. We must interpret Him as we see Him against the total background of the Old Testament, as the definitive conclusion of a religious and historical process which covered no less than 800 years and in its deepest roots loses itself in the mists of pre-history. We may think of the Bible as a gateway arch. The Old Testament is the sides of the arch; the New Testament is the keystone. Without the keystone, the remainder falls into a formless heap of stones: without the foundation of the arch, the keystone must either fall to earth or else seem magically suspended in mid-air, a miracle which none can understand. Both the Old and New Testaments are necessary to form that symmetrical and imperishable gateway by which mankind enters into the Kingdom of God.

However, the importance of the Old Testament for a theology for today lies not merely in the fact that it forms an indispensable introduction to, and commentary upon, the New Testament. The Old Testament also conserves certain theological values which in the New Testament are only secondary and can easily be forgotten. The first of these values lies in the Old Testament conception of God. The New Testament, when it stands by itself, can easily be used to sentimentalize and denature the

concept of God. Take such a wonderful doctrine as that found in the Johannine epistles, "God is love." How easy it is to take this formula and make it a reversible proposition, "God is love, and love is God," and thereby make the nature of God a mere emotional abstraction. The author of these epistles says that wherever men manifest love in their relations with their fellow-men, there God Himself is manifested. It is a sublime conception, and one which has inexpressibly enriched the thought of the world. But, when it is treated as though it were created in vacuo, and is abstracted from the total context of Biblical theology, it produces a misty and soporific emotional pantheism which leads ultimately to moral nihilism. No one who has thoroughly steeped his thinking in the invigorating theological waters of the Old Testament will ever be tempted by this sort of theological lotus-eating. Generally speaking, the character of God, as we encounter it in the pages of the New Testament, is a softer, gentler, kindlier one than that found in the Old Testament, and it is perfectly possible, by emphasizing these New Testament traits alone, to arrive at a conception of God which reduces His Fatherhood to a kind of fumbling paternalism. But whatever other criticisms one might make of Him, one could never suspect the Yahweh of the Old Testament of fumbling or of sentimentality, and a firm grasp upon the theology of the Old Testament is the surest safeguard we have against any denaturing of the God of the New. And one must not forget, that the God of the New Testament is the God of the Old. The writers of the New Testament believed in the theology of the Old. The God of the Johannine

epistles is not simply hypostatized amiability. He is the God who was known in the thunders of Mt. Sinai, who "maketh the morning darkness and treadeth upon the high places of the earth," who rode as Yahweh Sabaoth before the armies of Israel, but who was also known to Elijah in a still, small voice, and who, most wonderful of all, reveals the inmost essence of His being in the love which man bears to his fellow man.

In modern times, we have been greatly concerned to vindicate belief in God, and many modern apologists have grasped eagerly at the crumbs of comfort which have fallen from the tables of the scientists and secular philosophers. A few years ago, before social and international problems had thrust themselves so imperatively into our consciousness, there was a good deal of talk about whether one could believe in God or not. No doubt, once this present emergency is past, during which there has been the usual and pragmatic revival of religious faith and practice, the academic questions will be raised again and we shall once more be asked to be grateful for the support which secular science and philosophy occasionally give to our belief in God. The scientist and philosopher, when he is not a practicing Christian, often does believe in God, if you allow him to define what he means by God. For him, God is the Absolute, God is the order of the universe, God is law, God is the impersonal source of values, God is a projection of man's highest ideals and aspirations upon the gigantic screen of the heavens. To the secular scientist and philosopher, belief in God is likely to be either, at best, a convenient working concept or, at worst, a sop to the invincible superstitions of humanity. If our faith has been nur-

tured on the faith of the Old Testament, we shall not be hysterically gratified by these condescensions. For all such attempts at definition have one defect in common. The God whom they define, even if He exists, has no significance for religion. You cannot say prayers to the Absolute, to the Universal Law, to the indifferent God of scientific pantheism. Nor does such a God have any real significance for the moral life, for, since God is not a person, He cannot be the source either of personal emotions or of moral sanctions. We do not want to appear obscurantist or anti-intellectual, but we must keep our feet on the bedrock of reality and not imagine that we are vindicating belief in God when in reality we are only salvaging the word. The Old Testament is good medicine for this particular form of weakness.

The great notes of God's character in the Old Testament are His Reality, His Personality, His Will, and His Power. Strictly speaking there is no theology in the Old Testament. The Semites had no capacity for metaphysics or abstract thinking of any kind. The Semitic mind is intensely concrete and is concerned with principles only in so far as they affect concrete situations. It is said that there is only one passage in the Old Testament which treats of the metaphysical nature of God (Isaiah 31), in which we are told that God is spirit and not flesh. But this passage only serves to confirm our general proposition, for it was intended to have the practical effect of discouraging the politicians of Isaiah's day from relying upon Egyptian horses for deliverance from their enemies rather than upon the mighty spirit of God. And just as there is no metaphysics in the Old Testament, so

there is no apologetics. The existence of God is simply assumed, as indeed it is assumed by our Lord. The writers of the Old Testament have no doubt that God is real, so real that His existence is beyond controversy. We may dislike Him, as at times Jeremiah and Job did, but we cannot doubt that He is. That God existed seemed as evident to the Semite, as that the sun, or the world, or that he himself existed. It is a healthy and stimulating air for us to breathe. And even as the Old Testament is filled with the intense sense of the Reality of God, it also entertains no doubt that He is a person. Indeed, the criticisms made of the Old Testament are often based upon a feeling that the personality of God is too obtrusive. The Old Testament is filled with anthropomorphic and anthropopathic expressions. God is a jealous God. He is wrathful and then repents Him of His wrath. He loves one person and hates another in a wholly irrational manner. One could go on at great length to enumerate the human weaknesses of Yahweh. Most of these passages, it is true, come from the earlier strata of the Old Testament. But even the greatest and most spiritual writers of Israel did not hesitate to use anthropomorphisms of the most daring type. However much some of the anthropomorphic expressions of the Old Testament may offend us, they can leave no doubt in the mind of any one that the God of Israel is intensely personal. There are many passages which indicate that God manifests Himself in nature, but there is never the slightest doubt that God is in control of nature and is not to be identified with it. And because God is personal, so personal that He bears a proper name, He is a God who is adequate to

religious faith. This is a God to whom one can pray and offer praise and make confessions of his sins. Furthermore, this is a God who can make moral demands upon His worshippers. Precisely because God is personal, He is moral. When the Old Testament gives a systematic definition of the nature of God, it does so not in metaphysical but in moral terms. Compare, for instance, the definition of God given in the first of the 39 Articles with that in Exodus 34: 6-7. One is essentially Hellenic; the other is aggressively Semitic. Both are important, but how inadequate our conception of God will be, if along with a necessary metaphysical and speculative theology we do not preserve the bright and vivid emphasis of Semitic thought upon the intense Reality of God, and the overwhelming holiness of His moral character! Here is a God who is adequate for a world in crisis and who can be set against the unclean gods of Teutonic and Oriental paganism as He once was set against Chemosh and Melkart and the grisly deities of the ancient East.

With regard to our doctrine of God, one other point which needs to be emphasized, and which is clearly brought out in the Old Testament, is the conviction that God is in control of history. There is, in our day, a renewed interest in the philosophy of history, indeed, one might say a renewed belief that a philosophy of history is possible. Of this fact, the writers of the Old Testament had no doubt. They believed, sometimes in rather crude fashion, that God has a plan for history, and that, in the long run, He manipulates the forces of history to His own ends. He brings the children of Israel from Egypt, the Phil-

istines from Caphtor, the Syrians from Kir. The Assyrians are only the rod of His wrath, of whom He will dispose in due time. Cyrus is His servant, whom He raised up to accomplish His will. But more important for us, perhaps, than the fact that the Old Testament teaches a philosophy of history, is the fact that it reveals the actual working of God in history. There is nothing more calculated to fill men with good courage for today than the story of the people of God and the long, tortuous, often tragic way by which the hand of God has led them. The two most amazing events in world history are the two which mark the climaxes of the Old and New Testaments: the destruction of Jerusalem in 586 B.C., marking the end of the Hebrew Kingdom; and the crucifixion of our Lord Jesus Christ. Any clear-minded, intelligent person, who might have been present at either of those events, would surely have said, "This is the end." And yet, what we should have thought was the end was actually only the beginning—the beginning, in each case, of a history so glorious that the mind of men could never have imagined it: in each case, a history which has continued down to the present day. So Sacred History reveals God, moving in mysterious ways His wonders to perform, as the great men of Israel never doubted. Old Testament History confirms the affirmations of Old Testament Faith.

The Old Testament is the most intensely realistic of books. Just as its theology is almost naively realistic, so is its ethics. At this point, too, the Old Testament will do yeoman service in keeping our feet upon the solid rock. Those whose thinking has been kept

clear by the stimulating winds of prophetic thought will never be in danger of thinking of morality as something merely personal and individual. To the Old Testament, morality is intensely social. What is today called the Social Gospel plays a comparative minor role in the New Testament. It is implicit in the New Testament doctrine of man and of man's relationship to God, but only occasionally does it become explicit. The New Testament has little to say about human society and the transformation of social relationships, partly because it is saturated with a sense of the impermanence of all things human. One does not have to subscribe wholeheartedly to the belief that all New Testament ethics is merely an interim ethic, to recognize that this sense of the imminent end of society made it difficult for New Testament writers to be deeply concerned with social problems. In the Old Testament however, a book which, in the main, is concerned with the problems of life here and now, the social question is a matter of constant attention and even of paramount importance. One cannot understand the history of the Hebrews unless he is conscious of the background of social conflict. The Hebrews brought with them out of the desert, in which they had formerly moved, certain conceptions of human society which are common to nomadic life. To translate them into modern terms, they are: ideals of democracy, brotherhood, simplicity, justice, a sense of the common responsibility of all for each. In Palestine, these ideals came into sharp conflict with the ideals of a landed and aristocratic society, represented by the Canaanites and the great nations of the ancient oriental world.

The conflict is seen at its sharpest in the stories of Rehoboam and Ahijah the Shilonite, of Ahab and Elijah, of Amos and Jeroboam II. It was in the heat of this conflict that Hebrew religion was forged, and it is from this conflict that the Old Testament receives its intense concern with the social problem. It is hardly necessary to quote relevant passages, since they have entered so deeply into our own religious consciousness. Typical are Amos 5: 21-24, Micah 2: 1-2, Isaiah 1: 10-23, Isaiah (III) 58: 1-9. Deuteronomy, perhaps our Lord's favorite book, is full of it. Justice, brotherhood, the dignity of the common man, contempt for a luxurious and idle leisure class—all these things are writ large on the pages of the Old Testament. And when we see the New Testament against that background, how much richer many phases of New Testament thought become! It is in terms of this ancient Hebrew tradition that we must understand our Lord when He speaks of the Kingdom of God. This explains the simple mode of life which He adopted and His interest in little men, His contempt for the hypocritical religiosity of the well-to-do Pharisees, and the naturally communistic mode of life adopted by His disciples and the first church in Jerusalem. It is as we read the New Testament in close conjunction with the Old that we realize how deeply our religion must be concerned with the social questions of our day. As long as the Old Testament is read and studied and preached among us, we shall be in no danger of substituting a religion of "pie in the sky" for a religion profoundly concerned, not just with "social problems" in the abstract, but with getting justice done for the little people of the earth.

There is just one other subject upon which I wish to touch. It is that of the relationship of the Old Testament to our doctrine of the Church. How many Christian people still think of Whitsunday as the Birthday of the Christian Church? Yet the clear doctrine of the New Testament is that the Church did not begin on Whitsunday, but rather on that day—symbolized by the mysterious and fascinating legend of the calling of Abraham—when God chose for Himself a peculiar people. Until the coming of Christ, Israel was the Church. What we call the Catholic Church is simply ancient Israel which has now burst the bonds of nationality and race. Israel was the nucleus around which the universal Church should grow. Because Israel was the Church, Christians of the early apostolic age continued to live and worship within the framework of the synagogue. It was only when the Jews rejected the claim that Jesus was the Christ that a separation came. And it was altogether consistent with their presuppositions that the Christians believed it was "Israel according to the flesh" which made the break, which separated itself from the *true* Israel. It was the Jews who had rejected the divine plan, and thereby had renounced their claim to be the true Israel. Israel was now the congregation of those who believed in Jesus as the Christ. The Old Testament and its promises no longer belonged to that Israel which counted its descent from Abraham, but was now the possession of that new, spiritual Israel for which faith alone was a condition of membership. St. Paul, in the epistle to the Romans, speaks of Israel in terms of an olive tree, the original

branches of which have had to be broken off. In their place, but still on the same ancient trunk, growing from the same immemorial roots, we, the Gentiles, have been grafted to form the new Israel, the new people of God. So regarded, the Old Testament is not simply an interesting history of an ancient people who happen to have had a special genius for religion, but it is our own history. The Old Testament is just as truly Church history as is Eusebius or the Venerable Bede. Incidentally, such a conception has its practical consequences for our present world, infected as so much of it is with the hideous virus of Anti-Semitism. For the Jews are not a curious race of foreigners living amongst us. They are, in literal fact, our own contemporary spiritual ancestors, and to them we should be bound by ties of especial concern and affection. Call their present position "national apostasy" if you will, but then go and read the 9th, 10th and 11th chapters of Romans, in which Paul expresses his own yearning love for this unhappy people, "whose is the adoption and the glory and the covenants and the promises," and suggests that God is reserving them for a special purpose of His own.

So the Old Testament deepens and broadens our conceptions of the Church. The Church is not only the mystical Body of Christ. From another point of view, it is a nation, a race, a spiritual commonwealth, which in God's providence is destined eventually to include within itself all the nations and races of the world. That tree which began to grow when a little group of half-civilized nomads came from the distant lands of the East and settled in Canaan,

has become a great tree under whose branches the nations of the world find rest and shelter. We who are Gentiles, grafted into that tree which is the Israel

of God, are daily nourished by the fruitifying life which flows upward through that sturdy trunk and from those gnarled and ancient roots.

EMPIRICAL METHOD AND ITS CRITICS

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Empirical method in religious knowledge has been variously criticized. Usually the empiricism attacked has been very narrow in its scope, and even then it has been brilliantly defended.¹ Our task in this essay is not to repeat what has been written previously in relation to the subject. Our problem is to restate the method of empiricism in terms which are true to its essential meaning, and yet in such an expanded form that only a few of the customary criticisms remain pertinent.

A *rigorous empiricism* is the restricting of all knowledge to what can be observed and the inferences which can be made on the basis of the data. We know "events" and we assume that the object of knowledge is simply what it does. We find this in the operationalism of John Dewey and in the stressing of sense data as basic to religious knowledge in the thought of Henry Nelson Wieman and Edwin R. Walker. In the end, this restricted empiricism leads to knowledge of relations between events; and unless metaphysical presuppositions are assumed from the beginning, we cannot get further than the radical

empiricism of William James, i.e., a thing is what it is experienced as.

An *expanded empiricism* is nearer to common sense. It deals with all the experiences of men, both in the past and in the present. It begins with a rigorous empiricism, but the assumptions of an epistemological realism and metaphysical categories (usually the philosophy of organism) are brought into the picture. Empiricism becomes not an isolated methodology, but is put into the framework of epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions.

This type of empiricism finds its data first of all in sense experience, and this remains primary. Then the meaning of experience is expanded to include all of man's reactions to his environment, which means finding a place for appreciation, intuition, imaginative insight, and personal relations. This empiricism is just as rigorous in its investigations, but in order to account for the meanings that are found in the universe it must be *expanded* to give an intelligent picture of the whole. Empiricism is still the appeal to experience, but it considers the richness of human experience and is not limited to the sense data of a naturalistic metaphysics.

The supplements to empirical method must also be recognized. As long as we

¹ E.g., Edwin R. Walker's two articles on "Can Philosophy of Religion Be Empirical?" in *The Journal of Religion*, April 1939 and July 1940.

must return to experience (no matter how widely interpreted), our knowledge must be of finite processes. As applied to the knowledge of God, empirical method gives us only an interpretation of how God works in the world. Empiricism is obviously limited in its interpretation, and when empiricism is carried as far as it legitimately can go there are data still unaccounted for. The richness of experience which is part of an expanded empiricism cannot adequately be systematized by the tools of verification.

While empirical method provides the most certain knowledge that can be discovered by man (outside of the abstract sciences), the results are tentative, providing practical absolutes but not theoretical certainties. When we go beyond empiricism, the results are even less certain. Still it is a form of knowledge, and by means of these auxiliary methods the empirical theologian can illuminate the concept of God. By use of analogy, value judgments, myth, poetry, and symbols, the concept of God can be given additional meanings, can be placed in proper metaphysical perspective, and can be interpreted as a specifically religious object.²

The empiricism which is worth defending thus begins with the data of sense experience, is enriched with additional factors of human experience, and is supplemented by auxiliary methods. Theology and philosophy meet, and the presuppositions of epistemology and metaphysics are used to place the concept of God in its proper place in the cosmos. Empiricism offers primarily a means of verification and reconstruction

of Christian theology and not necessarily the discovery of new truths; but when new truths do come, they can be accounted for on empirical grounds.

CRITICISMS OF EMPIRICISM

When empiricism is defined in this manner, some of the usual criticisms are already answered. But many other criticisms still seem pertinent, and some of them may appear even more applicable than when applied to a more rigorous empiricism. We shall consider briefly seven criticisms, remembering that our comments must have the appearance of a dogmatism which is foreign to the spirit of empiricism.

A. *Empiricism has been accused of constantly shifting its base of operations.* This criticism takes three major forms: (1) When empiricism is attacked on the basis of trying to justify tradition, the appeal is made to experience. (2) When it is accused of contemporaneity, it points to the traditional doctrines it has justified. (3) When it is criticized because of inadequate sense data, it shifts quickly to the realm of value-judgments.

(1) The answer which the empiricist gives is that the final means of verification is always present experience. The data to be interpreted, however, are drawn from the experience of the race. Traditional doctrines, especially those found in Scriptures and in official pronouncements of the various communions, are open to empirical investigation. The empiricist assumes that traditional teachings arose from the attempt to explain experience, and therefore they point to data of experience which ought not to be ignored. There is, also, a certain pragmatic appeal about any doc-

² Cf. my *What We Can Believe* (Scribners), pp. 201-221.

trine which has proved useful through the ages.

(2) Being a Christian, the empiricist may have a bias toward justifying the historic creeds, and as an empiricist he does not want to overlook any facts. His collection of data includes all that he can discover in the heritage of the race. His actual verification of those data must lie in present experience, either of himself or of others. He picks and chooses among the historic doctrines, and he has the tools with which to make valid choices. He notices that all theologians pick and choose, but sometimes it is difficult to discover the basis for their choices—especially when reliance is on some ill-defined "revelation" or "authority" which provides no grounds for critical choices.

(3) Many empiricists have confused value-judgments and judgments of fact. This is usually due to the false dualism inherited from Kant by way of Ritschl. There are two types of value-judgments in empirical theology. The first is made on the assumption that values and facts are part of the same order of reality and are experienced in the same way. This leads to the discovery of particular goods in the world of experience, and to the observation that these goods tend to emerge. The description of certain processes in the world of experience as "the growth of meaning and value" (Wieman's famous phrase) is a legitimate empirical procedure.

The second use of value-judgments does not depend on any theory of value, provided values are not conceived as purely subjective. When the theologian begins to make use of the methods which supplement empiricism, he is justified in using the techniques of the "value theory" theologians in saying

that God *ought* to be such-and-such. He has no right to argue from the *ought* to the *is*, but once the existence of God is established on empirical grounds as the producer of values, then value-judgments about his nature are perfectly legitimate although less certain than strictly empirical judgments. (We will return to this point below, E).

B. *Empiricism has been criticized because its results are tentative.* And when empiricism is supplemented by auxiliary methods which are even more tentative, this accusation seems even more pointed.

The answer of the empiricist can only be the counter-claim that all methods of knowledge are tentative, and this method is the only one which can lessen the degrees of tentativeness by its own method. Simply because the empiricist is never satisfied, he must keep refining his method, clarifying his concepts, increasing the variety of his data, and enlarging the scope of his procedures. But the tentativeness is purely theoretical, and it is not to be equated with uncertainty, agnosticism, or lack of assurance and faith.

Theoretical tentativeness is congenial with practical *certitude*. If I can be as certain of my God as I am of the rising of the sun and the going down of the same, that is sufficiently practical certitude for religious commitment. There is no reason why one cannot have the psychological and religious attitude of absolute commitment to a God about whom one has practical certitude. As long as the God to whom one is committed gives every indication of being sovereign, just, and loving, there is an adequate basis for absolute faith.

From the practical point of view, the empiricist provides just as certain a

foundation for religious living as can the follower of any other method. It is only in the realm of *theory* that the empiricist admits his tentativeness. And his claim is that other methods not only lead to less demonstrable certainty but that these other methods have no way of decreasing the degrees of tentativeness without relying upon empiricism.

If "faith" can be said to have any place at all in epistemology, it is a faith that what is believed corresponds to reality. In this sense, there is faith in every kind of theory of knowledge except solipsism. It is the faith of the empiricist that what is experienced, when critically analyzed and tested, can be said to correspond to reality; indeed, it is reality. Empiricism, as we are using the term, relies on a realistic theory of knowledge (although some empiricists have been disguised idealists, phenomenologists, and operationalists). The empiricist believes he is dealing with reality as it is. He may have tentative conclusions about the nature of that reality, but he is convinced that there is a real, objective field of events in accord with his experiences.

C. *Empiricism has been accused of operating with a bias.* It has been accused of starting with such a prejudice toward the Christian tradition that other data are excluded. "It can yield religious conviction only to those who already possess religious faith or at least are conscious of a religious need."³

³ G. F. Thomas, in *The Nature of Religious Experience*, ed. by J. Seelye Bixler (Harpers), p. 50. The essays in this symposium in honor of a foremost empiricist, Douglas Clyde Macintosh, are consistently critical of all appeals to experience, although written by former students of Professor Macintosh. His answers are to be found in a series of articles in *The*

The answer to this criticism is threefold: (1) There is no rational argument which is convincing unless the presuppositions are accepted by the opponent, and this is true of every method of knowledge. Empiricism is more likely to succeed because it begins by appealing to our common human experiences, gives an interpretation of something already held in common, and uses tools which are comprehended by and acceptable to the modern man.

(2) The empiricist is interested in the Christian tradition as a source of religious knowledge. He believes that the Christian tradition arose as an attempt to interpret significant and in some cases unique experiences. But because the empiricist recognizes this bias, he is able to be critical both of his own attitudes and of the traditional concepts he is testing. Thus, the findings of the empiricist are important in establishing both the true and the false in the inherited tradition.

(3) It is important to recognize the place of bias in all knowledge. The fact that the empiricist is interested in establishing the truth of religious beliefs is a bias. But knowledge is always the result of interest and attention, and there is bias in the seeking of all knowledge. In religious knowledge there is a greater appeal to the emotions, and therefore objectivity is even harder to maintain. Empiricism as we have defined it is able to take care of the inevitable bias and correct it. But bias is not always to be discounted; there is no such thing as purely disinterested knowledge. "The religious intensity of bias may heighten sensitivity and sug-

Review of Religion, May and November, 1939, and January, 1940.

gest lines of solution for problems which might otherwise be missed."⁴

D. *It is claimed that empiricism has no place for revelation.* This criticism assumes that there is a distinction between natural and revealed theology. In scholastic thought, revealed theology completes natural theology. In Tennant's empiricism, natural theology must operate without recourse to religious experience and revelation.

A proper understanding of "enriched" empiricism leads to a discarding of this distinction between natural and revealed theology. "Faith," revelation, and religious experience provide data for an empirical theology just as surely as do the experimental procedures of modern physics. The problem is *not* one of turning uncritically to revelation after empiricism has exhausted itself (or has been rejected), but of enriching empiricism by including so-called revelations as part of the primary data.

Empiricism, operating within the "bias" of the Christian tradition, takes revelation as found in the Bible with utmost seriousness. It assumes that all experiences are capable of being understood as revelations of God, and that unique experiences may be understood as special revelations which also can be verified by empirical tests. Those which cannot be verified by a rigorous empiricism are relegated to the realms of the supplementary methods of empiricism, where they do not have so much weight, perhaps, in the realm of theory, but where they can be of supreme importance in religious living. The false claims are discarded.

The critical examination of the claims

of revelation, religious experience, and the demands of faith does not place them outside an enriched empiricism. It keeps them within the framework of empirical procedure and builds a superstructure of beliefs which are not capable of being verified in direct experience. It is not a question of empiricism *or* revelation, for that impoverishes both. It is a problem of enriching empiricism by allowing the claims of revelation to be considered seriously and critically. The empirical theologian may not be able to discover new revelations (unless he is also a prophet and seer), but he should be able to discover techniques for testing revelations which come to others, however unique they may be.

Because of this concern for revelation, the empiricist does not ignore the Bible. The Bible, as understood by critical scholarship, becomes the primary source of data for religious knowledge. Doctrines which are drawn from the Bible depend upon the experiences portrayed in Biblical history. Therefore, the empirical theologian welcomes the findings of Biblical critics, and builds his theology accordingly. In particular, the empirical approach to Christology depends to a great extent upon the historical reconstruction of the evidence.

E. *There is much criticism of the empirical approach to value as a criterion of the divine.* This criticism takes three significant forms: (1) criticism of the reliance on value as part of the primary data of religious knowledge; (2) criticism of the argument from the *ought* to the *is*; (3) criticism of the use of logically prior relative values in approaching the absolute.

(1) Values enter into the heart of

⁴ E. R. Walker, in *The Journal of Religion*, 20: 244.

empirical theology, and those who do not accept the objectivity of values or the reliability of value-judgments criticize empiricism from a different set of presuppositions. Empiricism assumes that values are objective and are part of the world of experience. The particular theory of value may be objective relativism, or the idea that values are found in the externality of relations between events, or in some idea of values as essences; but the important thing for the empiricist is that the values themselves do not depend for their existence upon an evaluating agent. It is a denial of subjectivism in value-theory. That this is a large assumption is obvious; but once the assumption is made, either the assumption can be flatly denied or the position should be criticized on the basis of the assumption.

If values exist independently of the evaluating agent, then the emergence of those values has obvious theological significance. Of this the empiricist is convinced, even though he assumes only that God is the process out of which come values. On the basis that a thing *is* what it *does*, this is a legitimate conclusion. On the basis that what a thing does tells us the nature of the thing, we may assume that God is the *source* of what he does.

(2) A second criticism of the empiricist's use of values is of the argument from the *ought* to the *is*. When this is done on the level of strict empiricism, it is not valid. God *is* what he *does*, and therefore may be called the source of values, but God *is not* necessarily what he *ought* to be. The *ought* to the *is* argument is an inheritance from Ritschl, and is rejected by most empiricists.

There is, however, a valid use of the argument from value to attribute in the supplementary methods of empiricism. In building the superstructure of theology (which cannot be verified by empiricism but which must be consistent with empirical findings), one may argue that the God-who-is has attributes which we know through value-judgments. This does not use man's sense of values to establish existence, but it does use value-judgments to describe a God whose existence has been otherwise established. It is in the realm of value-judgments that absolutes may be ascribed to God. This is a means of going *beyond* empiricism without sacrificing the authority of empiricism.

(3) A third criticism is that empiricism makes use of logically prior relative values, obtained from non-religious experience, as the absolute criteria of theology. H. Richard Niebuhr has accused both Macintosh and Wieman of this.⁵ The significance of this criticism is *not* that we can avoid using norms and values derived from prior non-religious experience, but that we must take the proper precautions. If we recognize that (a) religious values are not different from other values, (b) that all experiences of value are relative, and (c) that value-judgments are secondary to the primary relationship between organism and environment, then we may use non-religious, relative values to illuminate the divine.

It is the experience of reality which is primary. The evaluation is secondary, although both facts and values belong to the same realm of actuality. The task of empiricism is to discover what experiences common to men have

⁵ In *The Nature of Religious Experience*, pp. 93-116.

"deity-value," to use Richard Niebuhr's phrase. The absolute is not discovered in the work of God as he is experienced. The absolute attributes of God are ascribed to him by means of interpretation according to the supplementary methods of empiricism. In actual experience, religious or non-religious, we discover only relative values and God is known only partially; but these experiences and values illuminate and make meaningful the concept of God, whom we believe but cannot prove to be absolute.

F. *Empiricism has been accused of supplying only impersonal relations between the divine and the human.* The first answer is that it is to the empiricist's credit that the non-personal working of God has been established in nature and history, even though God is essentially personal. The understanding of God's work according to natural and social laws is absolutely essential to theology. But empiricism never stops there.

When empiricism is adequately expanded, one of its fundamental sources of data is religious experience. If we can be empirical about such intimate and personal relations as friendship, marriage, the home, and the community, we can have a partial, empirical understanding of the relations between man and God. One of the weaknesses of empiricism is that this has not always been made clear, and God has seemed either too impersonal or too much like a human person. On the one hand, the continental theologians have dismissed empiricism because they restrict it to an "I-It" relationship, and, on the other hand, certain non-empiricists have rejected the appeal to the religious consciousness because it is fundamentally subjective and does not take account of

the lack of dependability and actual frustration which are present in so many searchings for God.⁶

Therefore, these critics appeal to some substitute for empiricism, such as revelation, reason, or faith. What is not seen is that empiricism (properly understood and applied) has room within its method for exactly the kind of personal trust which comes when one has made a satisfactory adjustment. There is frustration in all personal relations, but that does not mean they are not open to empirical study. Human experience is exactly the stuff out of which they are made, and the analysis of human experience is the only way we can ever have understanding of them.

The element of faith (by which we mean trust or commitment), which is involved in all personal relations, is essential to the experience of God, and is therefore part and parcel of the "I-Thou" relationship between man and God. All of this is grist for the empirical mill, which in turn can be illuminated by the use of supplementary methods. When faith operates as an integral part of the empirical method, it carries its own authority and certitude (but not theoretical certainty). God operates through non-personal relations, but the empiricist finds him most surely in personal relations.

G. *A final criticism of empiricism is its lack of an adequate metaphysics.* Either the empiricist has no definite metaphysics or he is a naturalist. Edwin R. Walker, using what we have called rigorous empiricism (actually restricted to sense experience), ends up

⁶ Cf. John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God* (Scribners), pp. 222-224; Vergilius Ferm, in *The Nature of Religious Experience*, pp. 26-43; Howard Jefferson, *Experience and Christian Faith* (Abingdon-Cokesbury), pp. 140-141.

with a stringent naturalism. But the type of empiricism we are concerned to defend can operate within almost any metaphysics. Metaphysics must be consistent with the findings of empiricism, but it belongs specifically to the theological and philosophical superstructure and not to the empirical foundation of the system.

Empiricism is consistent with naturalism, and the empirical naturalists have done an important task by showing how religious truth can be established on naturalistic grounds. It is probable that the establishing of verified religious truth on empirical grounds can best be accomplished within a naturalistic framework. Thus it is prior to the fuller picture of religious truth given by an expanded empiricism and its supplements.⁷

Empiricism is also congenial with the philosophy of organism (which may or may not be restricted to naturalism). This carries us into the realm of expanded empiricism, however, and therefore is supplementary to the primary investigation. When empiricism includes intuition, appreciation, and personal relations, it is still dealing with human experience; but it needs a fuller metaphysics to serve as a background for the richer meanings which are involved.⁸ Perhaps the next main task for empirical theology is to bring the Christian tradition to terms with organismic philosophy, just as Aquinas did for Aristotelianism and Augustine for Platonism and neo-Platonism.

Other metaphysical schemes have been used in connection with empiricism.

Brightman's empiricism leads him to a personal idealism; Pratt comes to a personal realism; Wieman remains a naturalist; Macintosh insists on a metaphysics, but does not form one, although he makes use of Whitehead, Morgan, and S. Alexander in his ontology.⁹ The empirical approach to religious knowledge demands a metaphysics, but it does not dictate which metaphysics except that it must be consistent with empirical findings. Metaphysics belongs to the speculative superstructure of theology, and at the same time provides a background for religious epistemology.

CONCLUSIONS

An empiricism which begins with a narrow and restricted definition, but which is expanded to include all human experience, and which then makes use of auxiliary methods to complete the picture, is a good deal different from the rigorous empiricism of Walker and Wieman. It is the thesis of this essay that if empiricism is understood in its broader sense without sacrificing the strict analysis of the facts of experience, it can meet the criticisms advanced by opponents and fellow empiricists. Empiricism is none the less rigorous for having a broader base of operations, and it absorbs to itself some of the virtues of other systems in its enriched form. But above all, if this type of empiricism meets its critics, it has one advantage over all other kinds: it can present a complete theology which does justice to the history of the Christian religion in terms which are vital enough and concrete enough to win the allegiance of men to the God of Jesus Christ.

⁷ Cf. "The New Naturalism and Christianity," *Anglican Theological Review*, 22: 25-35.

⁸ Cf. W. H. Sheldon, *America's Progressive Philosophy* (Yale) and *Process and Polarity* (Columbia).

⁹ Cf. D. C. Macintosh, ed., *Religious Realism* (Macmillan), pp. 383-409.

Church Congress Syllabus 37

THE ANGLICAN TRADITION

FREEDOM IN ANGLICANISM

By LANE W. BARTON

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The writer of this article was drafted because it was thought that a parish priest of the liberal evangelical wing of the church should give his views on the Genius of Anglicanism. It is a foregone conclusion, of course, that a liberal should select the freedom of Anglicanism as its genius. It is no accident that Anglicanism has produced many notable scholars. There are other areas also in which the free spirit of Anglicanism has produced leadership. However, the freedom which most impresses the parish priest is that which makes the people in the pew free to work the will of God. After all, the real test of our religion is the fruit it bears and, however highly we may regard academic freedom, the world is not going to be saved so much by academic freedom as it is by men realizing and exercising God's will in the world. Because the writer believes a free man can be a more effective man, and because he believes Anglicanism makes men more truly free in the sense in which Jesus meant us to be free, he counts this the most impressive element in the genius of Anglicanism.

A lot of idle talk is indulged in with respect to religious freedom. Many people the world over, and particularly in our own communion, interpret religious freedom as freedom *from* religion and *from* the responsibilities of church membership. It is hardly necessary to

discuss the consequences of this shallow attitude. More and more, the church as well as the unchurched are beginning to see that mankind has to choose, and choose quickly, between religious responsibility voluntarily undertaken and regimentation imposed by a totalitarian government. We of the church have rejoiced that within the Christian religion men can retain their freedom. We have offered the alternative (perhaps not in these simple terms but something approximating it), "Come to Christ and be free, or go to the devil and be bound hand and foot by government regimentation."

The unfortunate aspect of this is that we seem to offer men an absolute religious freedom as an alternative to an absolute political bondage. This is neither realistic nor honest. Indeed, it is a quite restricted freedom which men find in the Christian Church. We are free as Christians only in the sense that we freely elect to follow Christ and, as members of his Body, subordinate our will to his will. While members of the Body of Christ enjoy a freedom the world cannot give, we perpetuate an egregious fraud upon people if we permit or encourage them to think that no impairment of freedom is involved in becoming members of the Body of Christ. Church membership for a large portion of our communion is little more

than sanctified anarchism. Some words of John Middleton Murry (*Heroes of Thought*, p. 16) are pertinent at this point.

"The downfall and disintegration of the medieval church was a disaster. . . . Once it was destroyed, the acknowledged spiritual authority of the world was gone, and the flood-gates were thrown wide for the uncontrolled development of the individual man—for his science and his inventions, for his liberty and his democracy, and his final spiritual and social chaos. . . . The main hope of saving Christian civilization from total disaster is the rebuilding of the universal Christian Church—the recreation of an acknowledged spiritual authority."

It is the conviction of the writer that Anglicanism can be such a spiritual authority, and that its genius consists in its ability to retain and preserve the freedom of the individual.

How strange that a liberal should drag in this idea of authority! Has another liberal yielded to the Circe of authoritarianism? Be patient, gentle reader, and stay with me a little longer. It is a truism to say that the only real freedom possible to man is a freedom under law. If we do not like the idea of freedom under law, we can for a brief period enjoy the fool's paradise of anarchy, but we shall come sooner or later to the dreadful realization that this has led us into a regimentation which takes away every semblance of freedom. It is much the same choice the small nations of Europe had to make. They wanted to be free, and independent, yet they resisted any federation which would have protected them against the encroachments of Nazi tyranny. In the end they lost out completely. As liberals we have been so fearful of the authoritarianism of Rome on the one hand, and of extreme Protes-

tant Fundamentalism on the other hand, that we have gone off the deep end of religious and ecclesiastical anarchy. By this, I mean that we have watered down membership in the Body of Christ until it means doing what we jolly well please. In our eagerness to get people into the church we have refrained from teaching the obligations of church membership and often take people into the church on their own terms. When a man tells us he doesn't believe in missions, or that the Holy Communion means nothing to him, or that he doesn't like to go to church and has no intention of cultivating the habit, we gloss over it and present him for confirmation confident that the Holy Spirit will straighten him out! The ability of the Holy Spirit to enlighten people is not for a moment doubted, but it is shameful that we belittle the solemn obligations of membership in the Body of Christ. It is not only dishonest thus to misrepresent the church, but it is unfair to people to let them hold such erroneous views.

It is therefore small wonder that the church is ineffective. No wonder two-thirds of our members habitually absent themselves from divine worship on Sunday morning. It is no wonder that so many children of God and members of the Body of Christ are buried from secular and commercial funeral chapels. It is no wonder that our people seek out the psychiatrist rather than the parish priest when they are mentally disturbed. It is no wonder our communion has such a struggle financing its program and is outgiven several times over by obscure and less well-to-do religious bodies. Nor is it only the liberals of our church who display this irresponsible, tenuous, and anarchical spirit.

Prior to the last General Convention two of our bishops who stressed most heavily the authority of the church threatened to leave the church if *Basic Principles*, proposed by the Commission on Approaches to Unity, were approved and adopted! And some of our more advanced priests have been known to instruct their people, when they move into a community where the Episcopal church is more "protestant" than "catholic," to attend the Roman church. The whole church is guilty of depreciating the obligations of membership in the Body of Christ. We have been afraid to make the church strong lest we make the individual weak. The burden of this paper is that we cannot have strong individuals without a strong church; that it is the genius of Anglicanism to be an acknowledged spiritual authority which makes men strong by making them free under God.

What are these obligations of church membership? When a man becomes a member of the Body of Christ, what is expected of him? In this the Prayer Book is specific. Baptism makes a man a "member of Christ"; it grafts him into the "Body of Christ's Church," and he becomes "Christ's faithful soldier and servant until his life's end." Lest we explain this away as so much pious poetry, the Office of Instruction further specifies that the bounden duty of the church member is "to follow Christ, to worship God every Sunday in His Church, and to work and pray and give for the spread of His Kingdom." And lest anyone disparage the Office of Instruction as a recent addition to the Prayer Book, note these words from the *Didascalia*, ch. 13, quoted by W. J. Pyhthian-Adams in the *Church Quarterly Review*, June, 1943: "When thou

teachest, command and remind the people that they be constant in the assembly of the church: so that ye be not hindered and make smaller by a member the Body of Christ. . . . Do not deprive our Saviour of His members: do not mangle and scatter His Body." Back of this teaching of the primitive church and the formularies of the Prayer Book stands the vivid teaching of the New Testament. "I am the vine, ye are the branches. . . . As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me." . . . "That they all may be one." . . . "I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one." St. Paul emphasized this unity in terms of the human body. "So we being many are one body in Christ" (Romans 12:5). "For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body" (I Cor. 12:13). "Now ye are the body of Christ" (I Cor. 12:27). It is quite impossible, in the light of this New Testament teaching, to say nothing of the corroborative teaching of the primitive church as set forth in the *Didascalia* and elsewhere, for a churchman to arrogate to himself the independence and anarchy so typical of modern Episcopalianism.

If, therefore, a man is thus bound, where is his freedom? That after all is what most of us are interested in, and this paper aims to show how within the framework of the Body of Christ a man can be free. Let me cite as an illustration the experience of an alcoholic who found freedom from alcohol by joining Alcoholics Anonymous. In addressing a meeting of this group he said, "As long as I was living my own life, under my own power, I was helpless. I came into this group and for

the first time discovered freedom. I want to say here for the benefit of the new men present that you can't lick alcohol by yourself. You have to stick to the group. My salvation was found *within the group*." This man was not a churchman, and probably had never heard about the church as the Body of Christ, but he put into terms of practical experience what it means to be free within a group. Because churchmen have neglected the obligations of membership in the Body of Christ, we have made membership in the church little more than an academic theory. If we can recover this Anglican concept of the church as the Body of Christ, and can open the eyes of our people to the freedom which comes to men as disciples within the Body of Christ, we shall have given to the world not only a new freedom, but we shall have gone a long way towards transforming the world.

My experience as a parish priest has convinced me that it is possible to revive this concept of Anglicanism and make it work in the lives of people. Not long ago a young couple asked to be married immediately after the eleven o'clock service on Sunday morning. They would have preferred the customary fashionable wedding at 8:30 Saturday evening, but the groom was home on a limited furlough and it had to be on Sunday. Because the bride's parents and grandparents had grown up in the parish, the bride let me invite the members of the congregation to remain for the ceremony. Practically the entire congregation remained; in fact parents brought their children from the Church School in the parish house to witness the ceremony. At the proper place in the ceremony, the congregation was asked to join in the prayers for the

couple. Before the bride and groom left the altar rail following the Benediction, I said to them, "I want you, as you leave the Church, to look at that congregation. They are your friends, members of your parish family. I want you to remember as long as you live that they are remembering you and praying for you." If this sort of thing could become the accepted thing, and not just an accident made possible by a limited furlough, and if our young people when they come to the church to have God's blessing upon their marriages could feel that they are going out into the world not as isolated couples unrelated to the Christian fellowship, I am sure we should have more happy marriages. People simply can't live in isolation when they are a part of a community which cares for them! This principle works in other areas. In cases of extreme illness, groups of close friends of the patient can be brought together in church for intensive intercessory prayer. When this is done, the sick experience a freedom from the power of sickness which is made possible by harnessing the healing power of God. That is to say, people are free to fight against illness when they realize that they are part of a group which is upholding and strengthening them with faith and prayers.

There is, in addition to this, a freedom born in the act of public worship. We assume this obligation to worship publicly when we become members of the Church. "My bounden duty is to worship God every Sunday in His Church." It may be argued that there is a prior obligation, viz. "to follow Christ," and I should assent to this. In fact, all there is to being a Christian is following Christ. But we cannot di-

voice the obligation to follow Christ from the obligation to worship God every Sunday in His church. *How* shall we follow Christ, and *what* Christ shall we follow? These are not academic questions. Shall it be the poor Galilean carpenter who left his shop to become an itinerant preacher and teacher? Shall it be the Christ of *The Man Nobody Knows*? Or the Christ of the late Aimee Semple McPherson? Or the convenient, accommodating Christ we fondly imagine as we exercise our "freedom" as Episcopalians to absent ourselves from divine worship of a Sunday morning to tinker with the plumbing or repair to the golf course? Perhaps the connection between following Christ and worshipping God every Sunday in His church begins to make sense. Is it not possible that there is a connection between our indifference to worship and the world's disjointed morals and ethics? The world is in such shape that we dare not fool ourselves any longer. *It is in the act of worship that we come really to know Christ.* It is in the act of worship that we come really to *love* Christ. It is in the act of worship that we come really to *want* to follow Christ. And it is in the act of worship that God in all His glory comes into the souls of men to lift them out of themselves and to make them new creatures. It is in the act of worship that God really sets us free to do His will.

It is this conception of the church as the Body of Christ, giving priority to personal contact with God in worship, which holds the key to the real freedom of the Christian. Here in the worshipping Body of Christ we see the true genius of Anglicanism. In this sense as in others, Anglicanism is the "via media." It stands between the regi-

menting of the Christian under the hierarchical ecclesiastical system of Rome on the one hand, and the regimenting of the Christian under the literal fundamentalism of extreme Protestantism on the other. In Anglicanism, the individual Christian receives his orders directly from the God he meets in worship. He is not told by a priest nor yet by fundamentalist tradition what he may say or think or do. Here is the freedom which stands a man upon his own feet and utilizes his unique qualities of personality and individual endowment to forward the purpose of God as God reveals that purpose to him. It is to symbolize this primacy of man's direct approach to God in worship that we make our altars central in our churches. But we must not overlook the part played by the pulpit and the lectern. They are placed at the sides but they are still prominent, the one on the right hand and the other on the left. The lectern serves to remind the members of the Body of Christ who come to present themselves to God in the mighty act of worship that the religious activity of people as set forth in the Bible needs careful study and consideration. And the pulpit reminds this worshipping community that the living tradition of living men, in the person of the parish priest, the bishop, and the Lambeth Conference (the Church Council of our own Communion), has things to speak to us which deserve thoughtful attention.

Before this freedom within the Body of Christ can be made available to people in the church, two things seem to me to be necessary. The first is to lay aside our timidity and our confusion and make clear to those seeking membership in the church that our talk

about the importance of worship is not pious twaddle. It is not and never can be a debatable point whether the churchman shall worship God on Sunday or not. God, and the offering of ourselves to God in worship, may not be side-tracked for repairing the plumbing or playing golf. The member of the Body of Christ has a definite obligation to be there. To borrow from the remarks of the alcoholic already quoted, "He has to stick to the group." It is possible that our schedule of services needs revising. Certainly services should be arranged when it is possible for people to come. Too many services are scheduled when only women can attend! But the real difficulty lies in creating a conviction on the part of churchmen that nothing may interfere with regular corporate worship. Reviving the catechuminate of the primitive church, as a period during which the intention of candidates to perform their solemn obligations is tested, may be in order. If this emphasis upon solemn obligations and duties sounds authoritarian, let us be honest and remove from the formularies of the church this definite teaching. To take the attitude that this is authoritarian, however, seems preposterous and unrealistic. If we were marching people down to the river to compel them under penalty of death to be baptized, it might be construed as authoritarian; but we do not force people to be confirmed (except possibly those over-zealous and unreasoning parents who compel their children to be confirmed willy-nilly), and it is the height of insanity to admit people to the church without making the church's position clear. Garibaldi won Italy's independence not by inviting his motley followers to participate in a

campaign on their own terms but by challenging them with the difficulties and obligations involved: "I promise you no pay, poor food, and forced marches!"

The other thing we might well consider as a means of restoring worship to its place of primary importance is the revitalizing of Christian worship. I am not now referring to the the revision of the Prayer Book, though it needs constantly to be revised. For the present there is plenty to do by way of making the most of what we already have in the Prayer Book. For one thing we can utilize the variety permitted under the present rubrics. What a deadly thing it is that Sunday after Sunday in ever so many of our parishes we have the same identical form of worship. If it were not for the changing of the altar hangings and the changing collect for the day one would never know we were moving from Advent to Christmas or from Christmas to Epiphany, or from Epiphany to Lent. By confining the Exhortation, General Confession and Absolution of Morning Prayer to Advent and Lent, we should not only make those seasons definitely penitential, but we should give our people a fresh appreciation of the General Confession which they are likely to lose in hearing it Sunday in and Sunday out! Far more vital and important than variety is the spirit in which divine worship is rendered. It is, or should be, the most spirit-stirring and exalting experience known to mortal man. Yet few would suspect this, the way so many parsons drone and mutter our glorious liturgy with a pious canonical whine! We would not talk to our worst enemy the way we talk to God in worship! The volume of *Prayerbook Interleaves*, by

the late Dean Ladd, is brimming with ideas and suggestions. The offering of the oblations in the Holy Communion could be made a glorious experience if we presented them as impressively as we present the alms! Fortunately, we have done away with non-musical editions of the hymnal and already our people are responding in the singing of the hymns. This helps immeasurably to make worship a moving experience.

We have the freedom and—if we have not let it atrophy—the imagination in this communion of ours to make worship genuinely vital. When we make our worship a glorious act of offering ourselves, our praises and our thanksgivings to the Lord of all creation, things will begin to happen. People will catch the spirit. They will sense what it means to belong to the Body of Christ, to offer themselves, their souls and bodies to God in worship, and they will emerge from that worship new men, strong men, better men and, above all,

men who are free to work the will of God in the redeeming of our world.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Is it fair to say that freedom is the most essential characteristic of Anglicanism? If not, then what is the essential or dominant characteristic? What are the dangers involved in an over-emphasis upon religious freedom? Are these the same as in an over-emphasis upon political liberty? Can your view be supported by appeal to history?

2. Distinguish the proper exercise of authority, by the church, from "authoritarianism." Is it true that the modern church is too lax in asserting the commands of God? Does the church leave too much to the work of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of men? Is the author's plea a genuinely "liberal" one?

3. What are the real obligations of church membership, as set forth in the Prayer Book and elsewhere (e.g. in the Canons)? What place have tradition and interpretation in this definition? How does individual freedom, i.e. personal religious liberty, function within Anglicanism? Is this merely an ideal, or can it be—has it been—actually realized? In what other ways than in worship must this precious goal be sought?

WHAT IS THE VALUE OF THE STUDY OF CHURCH HISTORY FOR THE MINISTER?

By JOHN T. McNEILL

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INAUGURAL ADDRESS AS AUBURN PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY,
27 SEPTEMBER, 1944

The teacher of church history is sometimes disquieted by the evidence that some ministers regard the subject as of very little value. They have treated it during their seminary training as a requirement to be met—an obstacle to be overcome and left behind. The books they buy or borrow are such as deal with contemporary matters, with problems of thought or action in the present

scene. They approach these problems without much sense of the need of any historic perspective upon them. The sermons they preach rarely contain allusions to anything that happened or to anybody who lived between the end of the first century and the beginning of the twentieth. If they do introduce data of the intervening period, the references are apt to be very trite or very

hazy, or totally erroneous. A statesman who knew as little of his country's past as they know of the past of the religion they preach would be a shabby patriot and an untrustworthy leader.

Such a minister may have come to the conclusion that church history has no value as a factor in his equipment. It is his duty to give himself heart and soul to the good cause here and now. Why, he may ask, do you use the analogy of the statesman? Is not a truer analogy that of the physician? We do not require him to apply himself to the study of Galen or Paracelsus or to prove his expert knowledge of the weird leechcraft and brutal surgery of past centuries. We do things differently from the way they were done in the unenlightened days of old. We have trouble enough with Hitler without worrying about Diocletian. Let the dead past bury its dead. Leave the dead ages in their urns.

I speak not of all ministers, but of some. I am disposed to believe that they are fewer than formerly. But I am not setting up a straw man to fight with. This point of view is adopted or approached by a certain proportion of Protestant pastors. Yet they never push the argument to its conclusion. They do not exclude from their consideration the Prophets of Israel and the religious experience of that ancient people. Certainly they do not wish to black out or forget the glorious light of New Testament story. It is merely the eighteen eventful centuries between those pregnant ages and our own that they decline to know. They look upon their calling with the more or less defined assumption that the knowledge it requires, like that of a physician, ought to be of the latest medicines and opera-

tions for whatever is wrong. Now it is true that the religious leader of today must be acquainted with the scientific movements and with the specialist skills of today. But it is also true that his religion itself—that which commands and animates his service—is not born of modern science or rooted in it. It ought to be emphasized that in relation to history religion is in a position different from that of any science. In science new discoveries may quickly invalidate old basic assumptions. Thus the greater part of ancient and medieval science has lost all claim to acceptance. In religion on the other hand some of the most vital and perpetually inspiring insights are very old, and what is valuable in the contemporary is largely derived from distant ages. The well-equipped Christian leader will know the contemporary world and utilize its skills, but in doing so he will be moved by impulses that come to him out of by-gone centuries. The past is not dead. The good and evil in it live on with us day by day. We may try to leave history alone; but history will not leave us alone. It lays problems at our door, problems that will not be resolved in ignorance of history. Even if at first it repels us we shall need to come to terms with it, to wrestle with it until a blessing is given. We shall have to gain some measure of control of it if we are to amount to anything in the service of God and man.

Percy Bysshe Shelley at the age of twenty combined an intense enthusiasm to transform an unsatisfactory world with a distaste for history. This aversion, however, he resolved to overcome.

I am determined (he then wrote) to apply myself to a study that is hateful and disgusting to my very soul, but which is above all

studies necessary for him who would be listened to as a mender of antiquated abuses. I mean that record of crimes and miseries, history.

Whether we are menders of antiquated abuses or rediscoverers of lost assets, as reformers of our own generation we shall need to study the experiences of past ages.

It may even be that in this center of sacred learning in which eminent teachers of church history have hitherto labored, someone may share the heresy against which I contend. Perhaps I am addressing some who have been led to believe that history, including church history, as we read it, constitutes a meager and insufficient record, and is conjectural, untrustworthy and misleading. There are, we know, philosophers and historians who teach us to be sceptical about the value of written history as a guide to the real past. No one can deny that the unrecorded past is immeasurably greater in extent than that which is recorded. So much has been lost; is what remains worth credence? There has been censorship here and forgery there, and bias almost everywhere. Sir Walter Raleigh writing in prison his history of the world saw from his window two boys in hot dispute. They were contradicting one another about an incident they had both witnessed the day before. Raleigh asked himself whether historians were more likely to be right than witnesses, whether his own history could be trusted. There may be those who ask seriously: Was Henry Ford justified in saying (as reported), "History is all bunk"? Was Sir Robert Walpole right when he remarked, "I by long political experience know that all history is lying"?

Now surely a thoughtful considera-

tion of such objections will lead us to see that they belong in a category of sceptical observations of weary minds, and that if logically urged they would invalidate most of our working information. We know that our favorite daily paper does not contain a record of all that has happened since the previous issue, and that much of what it contains, is, to put the matter mildly, not objectively written. In these respects it is not unlike the works of Eusebius, Seekendorf, or Gibbon. Yet we value our newspaper and welcome it for what it is worth, knowing that we learn from it much that is useful. In history, as in other matters, we know something but not everything; we are subject to human limitations; we know in part. But we can claim some indisputable knowledge of real things. I venture to say that it is possible for anyone here to know the mind of Augustine or Bernard or Luther with a more assured knowledge than that with which he knows the mind and motives of any of the eminent religious leaders in this room or in America today. Their lives completed, their thoughts extensively recorded, their place in history established through centuries of influence, they cannot elude our quest. Of course there have been mute, inglorious geniuses in religion of whom history is oblivious, just as similar people are overlooked by the newspaper today. But these omissions do not cancel our real knowledge, and ought not to make us too apologetic.

Can it be possible that ministers neglect church history not so much because they despise the subject as because they shrink from the labor it involves? There is no denying its exacting demands. There is a discouraging vastness about it, so that men who have

made it the study of a lifetime confess that they have hardly passed the threshold of the mansion. Any competent knowledge of it is won at a high price, and in every case such knowledge remains disconcertingly incomplete. The study calls for attention to countless events, persons, documents, ideas, which, to those who cannot find the patterns in which these details are set, become tedious and forbidding. What difference if John XII was worse or better than John XXII? Why distinguish the decree *Sacrosancta* from the Bull *Execrabilis*? What rational purpose was served by St. Francis preaching to the birds or by entering this incident on the record of history? Who cares about the singular delusions of the Muggletonians or the Fifth Monarchy men? Why ask us to be fascinated by what the French Protestant Discipline of 1559 in its 24th article orders with respect to elders and deacons, or by the way in which John Wesley altered the Shorter Catechism of the Westminster Assembly?

Such matters take on interest only in a context in which they appear as parts of a whole body of knowledge the outlines of which are visible and recognized. If we are to discover values in the study of church history we must not content ourselves with homeless and wandering facts. We must discover their relationships; and beyond their immediate relationships try to discern the full significance of the pattern they take in the web of time. I have known students who outgrew a stage of revulsion to the labor of historical study and entered upon it with enthusiasm when for them details that in isolation had been meaningless began to assume meaningful structure—when they be-

gan to see facts as parts rather than as fragments.

This is to give an historic fact a dignity analogous to that which our religion gives to an individual man. Men are of value because God is mindful of them and visits them; they are not merely lost fragments of personality. The worker in church history respects a past event or utterance as a part of the unfolding pattern of man's historic commerce with God which gives significance to history itself, and especially as a detail of the total church—the great redemptive agency in time and the human scene. It is his sense of the immensity of the whole that makes worthful his studious attention to the parts.

The task of the minister is raised to a new dimension when it is done with a realization of its vast historic associations. His own sphere of activity is integrated with the expansive and enduring institution of the church of Christ. The church is more than an institution; but it is an institution. Some would prefer to say that it normally uses the institution which men call "church." Decrying of institutions in general and of ecclesiastical ones in particular has been the mood of many religious revivalists and of some mystics. It has also been the theme of irresponsibles and the delight of wild asses. Wise men know that the values of civilization are carried by institutions, and that where these are gravely defective or decadent they have to be renovated or superseded by others—not simply erased. They know that spiritual and intellectual movements perish unless they institutionalize themselves, and that this is necessary even though in most cases the process involves some loss of the initial energy and urgency of the

movement. So we find it profitable to preserve perishable fruit though at some sacrifice of its vitamin content. But this analogy from the canning industry is quite inadequate. There is maintained a continuous tension between the creative force of the movement, on the one hand, and on the other the rigidity of the institution which gives it security in a world alien to it. In the case of the church this never-ending controversy has shown many phases that may prove instructive in any given situation. But always the institution, with all its faults, is the necessary counterpart of the movement.

Because the historic Christian movement was of measureless dynamic energy, winning the complete devotion of men, it expressed itself in the greatest institution the world has seen. It is not a thing to be lightly prized by a minister in Hoboken or Cheng-tu in 1944 that the organization in which he serves belongs within that mighty structure extended through the centuries and through the world. He will be a more competent and effective minister if he possesses a keen realization of this fact; and he cannot realize it clearly without mastering the outlines of the history of the church. It is true that the institution has changed from age to age and from area to area, that it has often been disrupted and repaired, that it is today in disrepair; yet it is basically the same and serves the same purpose as of old. Consciousness of this impressive fact may become a personality-stabilizing factor of the greatest value amid the confusion of this era of accelerated and unpredictable change. While we retain our grip of this history we know that we have a part in the organization that has proved most durable

through periods of revolutionary turmoil which have shaken to their foundations the structures of secular government—an institution that has been restored when it was itself corrupted, and that has never ceased to offer sanctuary to spiritual idealism when this was rejected and menaced by a brutalized society.

But the matter goes deeper. The study of church history involves much that is emotionally enriching. It is the story of a great loyalty. We need the inspiration of the lives lived in devotion to Christ and in fruitful fellowship with his saints. There are the sinners too, pathetic sinners within and without the fellowship. It is all a heart-stirring and heart-rending tale of cruelty, heroism and patience, of repression and emancipation, of mental anguish and spiritual exultation, of sin, forgiveness and sainthood. If we love our fellowman we ought surely to love his ancestors and our own. If we do not love our brethren whom we have seen perhaps we may gain a fellow-feeling for them by reflecting upon the sorrows, aspirations and struggles of the Christians and others who passed this way before us.

In the past as in the present, it is not only the great who are worth knowing. Important also are the experiences of the common folk, people whose names are lost or unrenowned. As with the great, their lives are not all edifying. There was the peasant woman who pommelled the altar of St. Benedict, reproaching him as idle and slothful in order to arouse him and gain an answer to her prayers. When Canterbury Cathedral took fire in 1174 the crowd that gathered about cursed God and the saints for permitting the sacred struc-

ture to be damaged. But in every generation there have been thousands of unheralded saints, and of quiet Christian folk whose way of life invites our search. Some of them had notable experiences and a fine imagination. This vision of heaven is described by an unknown twelfth century monk who seems to have been a spiritual ancestor of Dante or of John Bunyan:

The glorious shining light was bright and smooth and so ravished a man that beheld it that it bore him above himself. . . . From the ground to the top of the wall there were steps ordered and disposed fair and marvellously, by which the joyful company . . . gladly ascended. There was no labor, there was no difficulty, there was no tarrying in their ascending; and the higher they went the gladder they were.

Religious life among the rank and file had its lights and shades.

We see too the tragedies of persecution, and, saddest of all, the persecution of Christians by Christians. What are we to think of scenes in which heretics are hanged or put to the sword or starved or burned, such as when Count de Montfort's orthodox "Crusaders" "burned innumerable heretics *cum ingenti gaudio*"—with huge delight? This too is church history. No one, I think, who is not an inhuman bigot or a sadistic pervert can read the history of the Inquisition and of the lynchings of heretics that preceded it without becoming more tolerant and considerate of others' beliefs and more resolute in defense of freedom of religion everywhere in the world. The wickedness and error to which men are prone must be known in order to be shunned.

When we begin to gain a real awareness of the Christian past, to count as our acquaintances the men and women

who inhabit it, to enter sympathetically into their troubles and rejoicings, to praise and blame and forgive and admire them understandingly, we come to know that history is not to be separated from contemporary life, and that the Christian fellowship is not to be thought of as broken into sections past and current. *Ecclesia triumphans* and *ecclesia militans* are one *ecclesia catholica*, and if we are concerned with the church now battling in the world we can hardly fail to be interested in the story of those who once constituted the church militant in earth.

Church history has, I believe, never been regarded by theological students in America as the most attractive branch of the curriculum. Yet I think it now attracts more and better students than formerly. Often its appeal to students begins somewhat late, so that their studies are attended by the handicap of a tardy beginning. Their early enthusiasms are often for subjects in which knowing how is emphasized rather than knowing. It is extraordinary how impatient young candidates for the ministry can be to learn all about preaching except its history. This is equally true of religious education and of pastoral counselling. Some go far in these studies, with no real awareness that they have a rich and varied history prior to John Dewey and Sigmund Freud. Even if the pastors of the ancient church, of the Middle Ages and of early Protestantism and Puritanism should prove to have been all wrong in their methods of counselling, it might nevertheless be useful to know their methods. Be assured, they had well-formulated methods and theories for this pastoral duty. In religious education too, they were, in their old-

fashioned way, somewhat expert. If I were in a pastorate I think I would make a regular habit of reading in the sermon literature of the church, from the ancient fathers to the nineteenth century. The almost innumerable medieval books for the guidance of preachers would not be neglected, nor the mighty preachers of the seventeenth century who offer so many masterpieces of thought and rhetoric. Of course we cannot preach their sermons, but we can find a wealth of suggestion in them that cannot fail to add to ours power, persuasiveness and grace. It surprises me sometimes that students who are expert in Bible interpretation neglect the commentaries and treatises on Bible books written by scholars of earlier centuries, and care not to know what the thinkers of the church have thought to be the message of the Bible. There seems here to be a curious lack of curiosity. The fault in all these matters lies, no doubt, largely with the church historians, whose range of research has been restricted too largely to the institutional aspects of the subject. They have been a small company of workers, and they have not adequately tilled all the ground. They have, alas, treated with relative neglect some areas of special value to the minister.

Every minister has, of course, his own peculiar aptitudes and limitations. This may be due to developed interests rather than to differences of native bent. When Dr. Johnson was in Edinburgh, Boswell tells us, William Robertson, the Scottish historian and ecclesiastic, remarked to him on the difference of talents: "One man has more judgment, another more imagination." The ponderous critic replied in his usual contradictory way: "No, sir (I do not

expect to write a book on Johnson, but if I ever do it shall be entitled 'No, Sir') it is only, one man has more mind than another. . . . I am persuaded that had Sir Isaac Newton applied himself to poetry, he would have made a very fine epic poem." Whether the Englishman or the Scot was right is for educational psychologists to determine. I am told that they are not agreed, but that they tend to favor the former. In any case, church history is so vast and varied that it offers scope for every man's talent. When once essential elements are mastered one may go where he will. But Robertson did not dispute Johnson's dictum that one man has more mind than another. One is reminded of the anecdote of a Scottish professor addressing new students: "If ye hae no the grace o' God, pray for it and the Lord will help ye; if ye hae no the brains, the Lord help ye!" But I believe we can truthfully add a footnote that students differ less in ability than in application to work. There is value in another saying of Johnson a few pages further on in *The Tour of the Hebrides* from which I have quoted. "Somebody," says Boswell, "talked of happy moments for composition, and how a man can write at one time and not at another." "A man may write at any time," growled the Old Bear, "if he will set himself *doggedly* to it." Boswell has "*doggedly*" in italics.

At the price of great labor and sacrifice, faithful men have recorded in substantial part the story of our religion and the page lies open for all to read. But it is to the Christian minister that it makes its primary appeal. Christianity is in its very nature an historical religion. It combines universal principles of redemption with an indispen-

sable sequence of events. It is promulgated in the New Testament in histories of Jesus and the Apostles. What is more, the very course of human history was altered by the events described there, and this record, with that of the Old Testament, goes on as an agency for making and renewing the church. The history of the church is the story of what Christ has meant to the world. We do not learn the work of Christ by perusal of Scripture alone, or by theological construction of a doctrine of salvation on a basis solely of scriptural data. The work of Christ is seen too in the historic struggles of the church and of the Christian people, in victory over sin and temptation in every Christian soul, in the devotion of the martyr and the illumination of the mystic, in the steadfast virtue of believing men in every calling. It is seen in every sincere act of Christian worship, in the widening communion and ecumenical fellowship of Jesus' followers, in the corporate testimony of the church to social justice and love, in every triumph over the world's demonic forces century after century. We cannot testify as we should to the work of Christ if we fail to give attention to these things.

It is for the historical specialist by ruthless critical method to determine as far as he can what is credible history,

and with honest synthesis to lay out for us the story of the past. The religious teacher may take the product of this labor for the furnishing of his own mind. It will prove an inexhaustible resource, an arsenal of Christian knowledge, "linked armour of the soul." I may not inappropriately quote some sentences from William Caxton, the early editor and printer of good books, written to describe a Christian romance but bearing suggestions of the nature and use of Christian history. In his preface to Malory's *Morte d'Arthur* (1485), Caxton wrote in his engaging way:

For herein may be seen noble chivalry, courtesy, humanity, friendliness, hardiness, love, friendship, cowardice, murder, hate, virtue and sin. Do after the good and leave the evil, and it shall bring to you fame and renown. . . . But all is written for our doctrine [instruction] and for to beware that we fall not to vice nor sin, but to exercise and follow virtue; by which we can attain to good fame and renown in this life and after this short and transitory life to come into everlasting bliss in heaven.

Without prejudice to other necessary disciplines, I invite you to be our companions in this study. I believe there are precious rewards for those who will "set themselves doggedly to it." I believe they will be like the blessed souls in the monk's vision: "the higher they went the gladder they were."

LEGAL ASPECTS OF PACIFISM

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The question that this article seeks to answer is, What are the legal aspects of pacifism, particularly as to its practice by persons who claim to do so as a result of their own personal convictions or as adherents of a sect whose theology embraces a tenet which strongly encourages pacifism? To understand the several legal aspects of this question, it is first necessary to know what pacifism means. Pacifism is simply the belief (with its consequences in practice) that it is morally wrong or irreligious to participate in any form of military training or service in any branch of the armed forces whether in time of peace or of war.¹ Because of the strong emotional appeal that pacifism has for the public in general, this age-old tenet has been exploited by a number of "founders and discoverers" of pacifist sects, and by various ministers, especially in the last hundred years.

The first point to consider in this article, therefore, is how the Supreme Court of the United States has viewed the subject of pacifism itself. In comparatively recent pertinent cases, our Supreme Court declared: "From the beginnings of our history, Quakers and other conscientious objectors have been exempted as an *act of grace* from military service, but the exemption, when granted, has been coupled with a condition, at least in many instances, that

they supply the Army with a substitute or with the money necessary to hire one. (Such pacifist practice had been permitted by a number of the *states* by express provision in their constitutions and statutes.² Since 1917, however, this pacifist practice by such *states* has been completely abolished and prohibited by Federal statute.³) . . . For one opposed to force, the *affront to conscience* must be greater in furnishing men and money wherewith to wage a pending . . . (war as a means of avoiding personal military service than the actual participation in the service itself). . . . Never in our history has the notion been accepted, or even . . . advanced, that acts thus indirectly related to service in the camp or field are so tied to the practice of religion as to be exempt in law or in morals from regulation by the state (or nation)."⁴ The pacifist "is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedience to no (Federal) constitutional provision, express or implied, but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of (the) Congress (of the United States) thus to relieve him. . . . The privilege of the native-born . . . (pacifists) to

² See *MacIntosh v. U. S.*, 42 Fed. (2nd) 847-8 (1930) for citations of express provisions of *state* constitutions and *state* statutes which previously had permitted such pacifist practice.

³ Selective Draft Act of 1917, Act May 18, 1917, c. 15, 40 Stat. 76, No. 203.

⁴ *Hamilton v. Regents*, 293 U. S. 266-7 (1934).

¹ This definition includes within its meaning such pacifists as Quakers, Jehovah's Witnesses, and conscientious objectors.

avoid bearing arms comes not from the (Federal) Constitution, but from Acts of Congress. That body may grant or withhold the exemption as, in its wisdom, it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the native-born . . . (pacifist) cannot assert the privilege. No other conclusion is compatible with the well-nigh limitless extent of the war powers * . . . which include, by necessary implication, the power in the last extremity, to compel the armed service of any citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or his views in respect of the justice or morality of the particular war or of war in general. . . . (A citizen) may be compelled *by force* if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes . . . or his *religious* or political convictions, to take

* "From its very nature, the war power, when necessity calls for its exercise, tolerates no qualifications or limitations unless found in the (Federal) Constitution or in applicable principles of international law. . . . This power is tremendous; it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, property and life. To the end that war may not result in defeat, freedom of speech may, by act of Congress, be curtailed or denied so that the morale of the people and the spirit of the army may not be broken by *sedition utterances*; freedom of press curtailed to preserve our military plans and movements from the knowledge of the enemy; deserters and spies put to death without indictment or trial by jury; ships and supplies requisitioned; property of alien enemies, theretofore under the protection of the Constitution, seized without process and converted to the public use without compensation and without due process of law in the ordinary sense of that term; prices of food and other necessities of life fixed or regulated; railways taken over and operated by the government; and other drastic powers, wholly inadmissible in time of peace, *exercised to meet the emergencies of war.*" *U. S. v. MacIntosh*, 283 U. S. 622 (1931).

his place in the ranks of the Army of his country and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense."⁵ If the law were otherwise, the pacifist "might (even) refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or in furtherance of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government. One who is a martyr to a principle—which may turn in the end to be a delusion or an error—does not prove by his martyrdom that he has kept within the law."⁶

As clearly indicated by the United States Supreme Court, there never has been in American history any *Federal constitutional provision*, express or implied, which exempted pacifists or even clergymen⁷ from compulsory military service. Such exemption, when granted, is strictly an *act of grace*, and has been only by a specific act of the Congress of the United States.⁸

One of the main reasons why our Supreme Court has viewed pacifists with such strong disfavor⁹ is because not only are they unwilling to bear arms, *but also because they are "disposed to encourage others in such refusal, . . . and . . . (are) without any sense of*

⁵ *U. S. v. MacIntosh*, 283 U. S. 623-4 (1931).

⁶ *Hamilton v. Regents*, 293 U. S. 268 (1934).

⁷ "The (Federal) Constitution grants no immunity from military service because of religious convictions. . . . Immunity arises solely through Congressional grace in and pursuance of a traditional American policy of deference to conscientious objection and *Holy Calling.*" *Rase v. U. S.*, 129 Fed. (2nd) 210 (1942).

⁸ Federal Draft Laws of 1917 and 1940 grant such specific exemption. See footnote numbers 20, 21 and 24.

⁹ *U. S. v. Schwimmer*, 279 U. S. 652 (1929).

nationalism . . . (and are) . . . not well bound or held by ties of affection (to our own nation and its government). Such persons are liable to be incapable of the attachment for and the devotion to the principles of our Constitution. . . . It is shown by official records and everywhere well known that during . . . (World War I) there were found among those who described themselves as pacifists and conscientious objectors many citizens—though happily a minute part of all—who were unwilling to bear arms in that crisis and who refused to obey the laws of the United States and the lawful commands of its officers, and encouraged such disobedience in others.¹⁰ Local (draft) boards found it necessary to issue a great number of noncombatant certificates, and several thousand who were called to camp made claim because of conscience for exemption from any form of military service. Several hundred were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for offenses involving disobedience, desertion,¹¹ propaganda and sedition."¹²

¹⁰ *Goldman v. U. S.*, 245 U. S. 474 (1918); *Schenk v. U. S.*, 249 U. S. 47 (1919); *Fraina v. U. S.*, 255 Fed. 28 (1918).

¹¹ *Franke v. Murray*, 248 Fed. 865 (1918).

¹² In the recent 1943 case of *Baxley v. U. S.*, 134 Fed. (2) 937, the defendant was indicted for counselling certain persons to avoid service in the armed forces. The evidence showed that the defendant had stated publicly that he was opposed to war and all killing of human beings, that he had advised his son (see footnote number 32 for his son's case) not to fight or wear the uniform, that Germany was sure to win the war, and that he preferred to live under Hitlerism in this country. In defense, the defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, claimed that he was engaged in teaching and preaching the cardinal tenets of his sect, and fulfilling the mission imposed upon him by God. In upholding his conviction, the federal court de-

Having given sufficient consideration to the subject of pacifism itself, the next phase to consider is the particular civil and criminal aspects of pacifism. The civil aspects of this question are two-fold: the first deals with alien pacifists who seek to obtain American citizenship under the Federal Naturalization Act; the second pertains to student pacifists who seek to matriculate at a state university which has compulsory military training. The criminal aspect of pacifism, on the other hand, concerns itself solely with the criminal prosecutions of pacifists for violations of the Federal Draft Acts. Each of these topics will be analyzed and discussed in the order of their mention.

The first topic for analysis under the civil aspects of pacifism is whether an alien pacifist is barred by the Federal Naturalization Act¹³ from becoming an American citizen. This Act provides that before an alien may be admitted to citizenship he shall declare on oath in open court that "he will support and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to same." The following three cases involve alien paci-

clared that "one is criminally responsible who does an act which is prohibited by a valid criminal statute, though the one who does this act may do so under a deep and sincere religious belief that the doing the act was not only his right but also his duty. . . . This seems to be one of those situations in which an attempt to employ religion as a sword prevents its use as a shield. . . . (The defendant counselled others to evade service in the armed forces of the United States); he thereby violated the Selective Service Act, and (therefore) the First Amendment affords him no protection."

¹³ U. S. C., Title 8, Nos. 381, 382, sec. 4.

fists, who made application for citizenship under the Act, and illustrate the conflict between their pacifism and national safety. In *IN RE ROEPER*,¹⁴ the petitioner, in open court, testified that he had, conscientious scruples against the shedding of human blood, even in war time, and that, if admitted to citizenship, he would not be willing to serve in the military forces of the United States, if called upon to do so. In denying his petition for citizenship, the federal court declared: "Citizenship is not merely a privilege, but an obligation as well, that in return for the rights of citizenship, certain duties are imposed upon the naturalized alien. . . . These duties so imposed . . . are 'to support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . and bear true faith and allegiance to same.' The duties so prescribed by Congress in plain and unambiguous language may not be lessened or diminished by the courts. *They make no exception to the absolute and unqualified provisions of the oath of allegiance.* The oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States embraces every method of support and defense which the government may lawfully prescribe. That it may prescribe support and defense by active military service is obvious from the constitutional provisions vesting Congress with the power . . . 'to declare war, . . . to raise and support armies, . . . to provide and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; . . . to repel invasions, and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.'"

¹⁴ 274 Fed. 490 (1921).

Thus from the excellent reasoning of the court in the *ROEPER* case, it can readily be seen that the strict rule of law in naturalization cases is that, in order to obtain American citizenship, an alien must give an absolute, unqualified and unconditional oath of allegiance to the Federal Constitution and laws with no pacifist limitations or reservations whatsoever. The importance of this strict rule is readily apparent in its application to the following two recent significant United States Supreme Court Cases which involved notable alien pacifists. In the *U. S. v. SCHWIMMER*,¹⁵ the respondent was a Hungarian woman, age 52, had lived in Illinois for five years, was well educated, and was known as a linguist, lecturer and author. In making an application for citizenship, she stated that she believed in our form of government, that she was willing to do anything that an American citizen had to do, but would not take up arms for the defense of the United States, and that she is an uncompromising pacifist with no sense of nationalism, but only a "cosmic consciousness of belonging to the human family." In denying her application, our Supreme Court declared that Miss Schwimmer is without any sense of nationalism and therefore "is not well bound or held by the ties of affection to any nation or government. (She is) . . . incapable of the attachment for and the devotion to the principles of our (Federal) Constitution that is required of aliens seeking naturalization." *The mere fact that Miss Schwimmer by reason of her sex, age or other cause is unfit for military service, the court concluded, does not lessen her power to influence others in*

¹⁵ 279 U. S. 644 (1929).

her pacifist notion of thinking which is apt to be more detrimental to the safety, strength and good order of the country than her mere refusal to bear arms. In *U. S. v. MACINTOSH*,¹⁶ the applicant for citizenship was born in Canada, studied at the University of Chicago, was ordained a Baptist minister, and was a teacher at the Yale Divinity School. Before the court, he asserted that he was willing to defend, with arms if necessary, the United States against all enemies, only when he judged it to be in the (quote) "best interests of my country, but only insofar as I can believe that this is not going to be against the best interests of humanity in the long run. I do not undertake to support my country right or wrong." He could not place allegiance to the government of any country before allegiance to the "will of God," and he believed that he had the right to judge the necessity of the war. In denying his petition for citizenship, our Supreme Court¹⁷ followed the rule laid down in the *ROEPER* case which requires an alien in naturalization cases to give an absolute and unqualified oath of allegiance in order to obtain American citizenship.

A thorough review of the *ROEPER*, *SCHWIMMER* and *MACINTOSH* cases reveals that in each case the alien in question placed his attachment for pacifism above that of allegiance to the United States. In the *ROEPER* and *SCHWIMMER*

cases, the aliens were both out-and-out pacifists, while in the *MACINTOSH* case, the alien was a partial pacifist who would bear arms subject to his own personal judgment as to the "validity," "necessity" and "morality" of the war in question. In view of the fact that in all of these three naturalization cases, the alien pacifist, who was involved, refused to give the absolute, unqualified and unconditional oath of allegiance, the decision by the court in each of these cases was sound.

The second topic for consideration under the civil aspects of pacifism is the matriculation of student pacifists at a state university which has compulsory military training. In the leading case of *HAMILTON v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA*,¹⁸ the facts were as follows: The University of California is a Federal land grant college. As such, it came under the benefits of the Federal Morrill Act of 1862. This Act donated public lands to the several states for the endowment and support of state universities, which by its provisions were encouraged to teach military science, besides the usual professional, classical, scientific and agricultural subjects. Accordingly, the University of California required as a condition precedent to the matriculation of male students the inclusion in their course of the subjects of military science and tactics of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps as prescribed by the War Department, which covered rifle marksmanship, scouting, drill and combat principles. The War Department furnishes the instructors, arms, equipment and uniforms to the students. The ap-

¹⁶ 283 U. S. 605 (1931).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 625; "We are a Nation with the duty to survive; a Nation whose Constitution contemplates war as well as peace; whose government must go forward on the assumption, and safety can proceed on no other, that unqualified allegiance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as well those made for war as those made for peace."

¹⁸ 293 U. S. 245 (1934).

pellant, a minor, is a devout member of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He enrolled as a student at the University of California, and presented a petition to the University in which he requested exemption from military training upon the grounds that it was against his religious convictions. The University rejected his petition. He had mandamus proceedings instituted against the University to compel his re-admission as a student. The sole issue in the case was whether the University of California's requirement of compulsory military training for its students violated the special privileges and immunities under the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and also whether it was repugnant to the 1st Amendment which guarantees religious freedom. In upholding the suspension of the appellant by the University of California, the Supreme Court of the United States declared: "The First Amendment, if it be read into the Fourteenth, makes invalid any state law 'respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' Instruction in military science is not instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion. Neither directly nor indirectly is government establishing a state religion when it insists upon such (military) training. . . . Every State has the authority to train its able-bodied male citizens of suitable age appropriately to develop fitness should any such duty be laid upon them, to serve in the United States Army or in the state militia (always liable to be called forth by the federal authority to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection or repel invasion) . . . or as members of a local constabulary force, or as officers needed effectively to police the state. And,

when made possible by the national government, the State, in order more effectively to teach and train its citizens for these and like purposes, may avail itself of the services of officers and equipment belonging to the military establishment of the United States. . . . The State is the sole judge of the means to be employed and the amount of training to be exacted for the effective accomplishment of these ends. . . . Government, federal and state, each in its own sphere owes a duty to the people within its jurisdiction to preserve itself in adequate strength to maintain peace and order and to assure the just enforcement of law. And every citizen owes the reciprocal duty, according to his capacity, to support and defend the government against all enemies."

In a case¹⁹ almost identical with the facts of the HAMILTON case, which involved the University of Maryland, the Court of Appeals of Maryland also upheld the suspension of a pacifist student for similar reasons: "The Court we think would be going very far if it should encourage this (pacifist) or like (pacifist) societies, or persons with similar views, in their interference with the constituted authorities in the management and control of colleges and universities when acting upon authority duly and lawfully conferred upon them. *Or to give encouragement to such (pacifist) societies or persons to interfere with the government in all lawful efforts to keep the country in a state of preparedness for war so long as the nations of the world continue to settle their dis-*

¹⁹ Pearson v. Cole, 165 Md. 224, 167 Atl. 54 (1933). On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, this case was dismissed for the want of a substantial federal question. 290 U. S. 597 (1933).

putes by means of war. A great majority of the people of this country are opposed to war, but unlike those of whom we have been speaking, they recognize the necessity of being prepared for war when it comes upon us. In preparing for defense, a military training for those who may be called upon to take up arms in defense of their country is a necessary incident thereto, and any effort on the part of any of the people to hinder or defeat the government in doing so should not be countenanced by the courts."

The concluding and most important phase for consideration in this article is the criminal aspects of pacifism, and covers all the cases which involve the criminal prosecution of pacifists for violations of the Federal Draft Acts of both 1917 and 1940. Because of the essential similarity of both the 1917 and the 1940 Federal Draft Acts, insofar as the scope of this article is concerned, no detailed distinction will be made as to the Act itself under which the cases in question are being prosecuted. Moreover, because there is only one such reported case under the 1917 Act, and in view of the fact that all the other such cases come under the 1940 Act, almost exclusive stress will be laid on the latter Act. The main pertinent difference between these two acts, incidentally, is that the 1917 Draft Act exempts only members of well established pacifist sects,²⁰ while the 1940 Act is more

liberal in that it exempts *all sincere religious conscientious objectors*.²¹

In the publicized SELECTIVE DRAFT LAW CASES²² which were decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1918, the facts were briefly as follows: The Federal Selective Draft Act of 1917 required all men between the ages of 21 and 30 to present themselves for registration for military service and to subject themselves to the provisions of the Act. The defendants failed to do so and were prosecuted under the penal provisions of the Act. One of the main defenses was that it was unconstitutional for Congress to compel military service by a selective draft because the Act violated the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, and affirming the convictions of the defendants, our Supreme Court averred: "The very conception of a just government and its duties to the citizens includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right to compel it." This ruling is based upon a fundamental principle of our Constitution that it is the "duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our government against all enemies whenever necessity arises. . . . The common defense was one of the purposes for which the people ordained and established the (Federal) Constitution."²³

²¹ Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Act Sept. 16, 3:08 P.M., E.S.T., c. 720, 54 Stat. 885, No. 305 (g), "exempts all those who by reason of religious training or belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." See footnote number 29 for Kauten case.

²² 245 U. S. 366 (1918).

²³ U. S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 650.

²⁰ Selective Draft Act of 1917, Act May 18, 1917, c. 15, 40 Stat. 76, No. 204, "exempts only those members of any well organized sect or organization whose creed or principles forbade its members to participate in war in any form."

The Federal Draft Acts of 1917 and 1940 both grant to the conscientious objector the choice of either becoming a member of the armed forces in a non-combatant unit or doing work of national importance under civilian direction in a public service camp. In all of the following cases which deal with the criminal prosecution of pacifists for violations under the 1940 Act, none of these individuals wanted to perform either of such services. What they all wanted was *complete* and *total* exemption from the draft, either as a conscientious objector or as a duly ordained minister. However, the Act grants such complete exemption only to duly ordained ministers,²⁴ but not to conscientious objectors. In all of these cases, the pacifists, whose claims were for classification as ordained ministers, were all rejected by local draft boards. Instead, the boards classified all the pacifists either as conscientious objectors or as I A, and ordered them to report, according to their classification, to a civilian public service camp or for induction into the military service. In every case, the pacifists refused or failed to report as so ordered, and as a result were prosecuted and convicted for violation of the Federal Draft Act. Most of these cases, incidentally, deal with Jehovah's Witnesses.

In the leading case of *BUTTECALI v. U. S.*,²⁵ the defendant made claim for

²⁴ "Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion . . . shall be exempt from (military) training and service (but not from registration) under this Act." 1940, Act Sept. 16, 3:08 P.M., E.S.T., c. 720, 54 Stat. 885, No. 305, d. This section of the Act also exempts theological students, but in view of the fact that there are no reported cases on this point, further discussion is deemed unnecessary.

²⁵ 130 Fed. (2nd) 172 (1942).

exemption as an ordained minister. His evidence consisted of a card from the Watch-Tower Bible and Tract Society which attested that he was an ordained minister of Jehovah's Witnesses. The ordination, itself, consisted of the defendant's avowal of belief in the doctrines of the Society, and the issuance of the certificate by its President. For the preceding three years, the defendant had spent a few hours each year distributing religious magazines of the Society that cost him 20¢ per copy and which he sold for 25¢, and once playing some of the Society's phonograph records. He never preached to a congregation, and the other carpenters, with whom he was regularly associated in his daily work as a carpenter, were all unaware that he was a minister. The defendant's claim for exemption as a minister was rejected, and he was convicted for violation of the Draft Law. In affirming his conviction, the federal court stated that "a duly ordained minister, in general acceptance, is one who has followed a prescribed course of study of religious principles, has been consecrated to the service of living and teaching that religion through an ordination ceremony under the auspices of an established church, has been commissioned by that church as its minister in the service of God, and generally is subject to control or discipline by a council of the church by which he was ordained. These ministers, and not those consecrated laymen happily found in the membership of every church who live and serve well, are exempt by the statute: *and the object of Congress in the enactment of the statute is not to be thwarted because a religious society chooses to designate its ordinary members as ordained ministers.*"

In a similar case, *RASE v. U. S.*,²⁶ the evidence in support of the defendant's contention that he was a minister of Jehovah's Witnesses consisted of a card from its Society to that effect with Judge Rutherford's *printed* signature, his preaching by means of the distribution of printed books, magazines, playing phonograph records of the Society's lectures, and oral presentation of Jehovah's Kingdom's message from door to door, and conducting Bible classes in private homes. The evidence also showed that for the past three years he had been employed as a gas station attendant, and later as a stock-keeper for a jewelry concern at a weekly salary. The conviction of the defendant for failure to report at a conscientious objector camp was upheld by the court in these words: "If we understand the appellant's argument, every member of his sect is a minister of religion and so entitled to exemption. No differentiation is to be recognized between . . . pastor and congregants. Followed to its logical conclusion, this would mean that all members of any religious group which imposes upon its adherents an obligation to teach and preach its beliefs or to make converts, are exempted under the Selective Service Act without regard to whether such activity constitutes their sole or principal vocation. It is inconceivable that it was the intention of Congress to incorporate in the Act an exemption so broad and all-embracing. . . . *No question of religious liberty . . . is here involved, and the zealous and ill-advised pursuit of a martyr role is not, by the sanction of the Constitution, permitted to imperil national safety, without the preserva-*

tion of which, liberty of conscience and religion will everywhere disappear."

In another case²⁷ of the same kind, the defense stressed the right of freedom to preach without restriction. In this case, the defendant was a Pioneer, a "full time preacher," in the Jehovah's Witnesses. He claims that this position requires him to devote all his time to preaching and teaching its tenets. *Plaintiff is just 21 and his principal witness is 19.* The local draft board gave him a 1A classification which the court affirmed in the following words: "If these young men having a zeal for the Christian religion which they claim to preach, and for the preservation of our constitutional form of government and their freedom to worship according to the dictates of their own consciences, would give more heed to the necessities of the present conflict and less heed to the necessity for them to solicit new members to their sect and preach the gospel, they would be rendering a service not only to their Nation

²⁷ *Meredith v. Carter*, 49 Fed. S. 899 (1943). A like case is that of *Drumheller v. Berks County Local Board*, 130 Fed. (2) 610 (1942). Here, appellant is a pioneer in the Jehovah's Witnesses, and claims to be an ordained minister. He had been classified as a conscientious objector by the local draft board, and ordered to report to a civilian public service camp. He claimed it would be a violation of his conscience to go to such a camp, that he felt he must be free to preach, and that he could not impair his function as a preacher by submission to any authority than that of God. He filed a petition to enjoin the board from sending him to such a camp. His petition was denied by the court which stated that as to appellant's belief of his particular theological covenant, we do not question his sincerity, "but he is none the less subject to all the laws of the United States which govern all other men in their duty to their country."

²⁶ 129 Fed. (2nd) 204 (1942).

in its dire needs, but to their own religion."

A condensation of the rulings in the BUTTECALI, RASE and MEREDITH cases reveals the law to be that one cannot be classified as a minister under the Federal Draft Act where the facts show that he is in reality nothing more than a congregant or a member of a congregation, that he has full time employment in a secular occupation²⁸ for some time prior to filing his draft questionnaire,²⁹

²⁸ *Checinski v. U. S.*, 128 Fed. (2) 461 (1942).

²⁹ The claim for exemption as a conscientious objector,* divinity student or minister under the Federal Draft Act must be made in the draft questionnaire (or before the local draft board or at the appeals draft board), and cannot be raised subsequently in any *collateral legal proceedings*, such as by *habeas corpus* (*Franke v. Murray*, supra; *Billings v. Truesdell*, 135 Fed. (2) 505 (1943); in *U. S. v. Phillips*, 135 Fed. (2) 521 (1943), a writ of *habeas corpus* was granted because the court found that the finding of the local draft board was grossly unfair and capricious, but there was a strong dissenting opinion in this case which upheld the decision of the draft board), *injunction* (*Drumheller v. Berks County Local Bd.*, supra), *mandamus* or as a *defense in a criminal prosecution under the Federal Draft Act* (*U. S. v. Bowles*, 131 Fed. (2) 818 (1942); *Goff v. U. S.*, 135 Fed. (2) 610 (1943); *Johnson v. U. S.*, 126 Fed. (2) 242 (1942).)

* *One who objects to a particular war on philosophical or political grounds cannot be classified as a conscientious objector under the Act.* *U. S. v. Kauten*, 133 Fed. (2) 703 (1943).

In the unusual case of *McCord v. Page*, 124 Fed. (2) 68 (1941), the plaintiff had enlisted voluntarily in the military forces of the United States. Later, while serving his enlistment, he claimed that he had become an "ordained minister" in the Watch-Tower Bible and Tract Society. He claimed that the tenets of his religion were incompatible with certain of his military duties, and did violence to his religious convictions. The military duties he particularly complained of were his duty to

and that his ministerial activities constitute only a minor part of his actual work.³⁰ In accord with this statement of the law, the courts (in upholding the rulings of the local draft boards) have denied classification as ministers to a farmer,³¹ carpenters,³² a gas station attendant,³³ factory workers,³⁴ Jehovah's Witnesses,³⁵ conscientious objectors,³⁶ a

salute his superior officers and the American Flag. He had *habeas corpus* proceedings instituted to obtain his discharge. In denying the writ, the court stated: "Military regulations requiring a soldier to salute his superior officers and his flag are not intended to interfere with religious liberties, and the enforcement of the regulations by a proper military tribunal does not violate the Constitution of the United States. . . . No invalidity in the enlistment is claimed, and an enforceable contract between the soldier and the United States was created thereby. He was fully aware of the duties he thereby assumed, and from which he now asks to be released. Uniquely essential to successful military operations, 'no question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer or the duty of obedience in the soldier.' " Although the Federal Draft Act was not in issue here, as the enlistment was purely voluntary, this case raises the same point which is to be found in practically all *habeas corpus* cases under the Draft Act, and reveals the pernicious effects of the spread of pacifist teachings upon members of the American armed forces at the present time.

³⁰ *Buttecali v. U. S.*, supra.

³¹ *Bullard v. Selective Service Bd.*, 50 Fed. S. 192 (1943).

³² *Baxley v. U. S.*, 134 Fed. (2) 998 (1943); *Buttecali v. U. S.*, supra.

³³ *Rase v. U. S.*, supra.

³⁴ *Honaker v. U. S.*, 135 Fed. (2) 613 (1943); *U. S. v. Mroz*, 136 Fed. (2) 221 (1943).

³⁵ *U. S. v. Di Lorenzo*, 45 Fed. S. 590 (1942); *U. S. v. Greime*, 128 Fed. (2) 811 (1942); *Fletcher v. U. S.*, 129 Fed. (2) 262 (1942).

³⁶ *U. S. v. Newman*, 44 Fed. S. 817 (1942); *U. S. v. Kowal*, 45 Fed. S. 301 (1942); *Haberman v. U. S.*, 131 Fed. (2) 1018 (1942).

hospital attendant,³⁷ a bank clerk,³⁸ and a Christian Scientist,³⁹ who was also a part time businessman and lawyer. The law is the same even though the person, who himself "claims" he is a minister, gives up all secular employment and over-night devotes all his time to preaching and conducting himself in the activity usually associated with a minister;⁴⁰ in other words, merely calling oneself a minister, and doing pastoral work exclusively, will not of itself make one a minister who is entitled to exemption as such under the Act.⁴¹

The important BUTTECALI case, previously mentioned, points out that in order to be a minister under the Federal Draft Act (1940), the law requires four theological qualifications: First, that claimant has followed a prescribed

course of study of religious principles; second, that he has been consecrated through an ordination ceremony under the auspices of an established church; third, has been commissioned by that church as one of its ministers; fourth, is subject to the discipline of the council of his church. In all of the cases under consideration in this article, in which claim was made for exemption as a minister under the Act, one or more of these four qualifications were missing, and therefore it is for this reason that the rejection of such claim by the courts was justified in every case.⁴²

Whenever a pacifist, be he a conscientious objector, Quaker, or Jehovah's Witness, is prosecuted for a violation of the Federal Draft Act, the defense of constitutional religious freedom is always raised. On this point, however, the law is well settled that although the government may not interfere with religious belief and opinions,⁴³ it can prohibit and punish religious practices that are criminal offenses.⁴⁴ Since the

³⁷ U. S. v. Messersmith, 138 Fed. (2) 599 (1943).

³⁸ Seele v. U. S., 133 Fed. (2) 1015 (1943).

³⁹ In Re Rogers, 47 Fed. S. 265 (1942), the petitioner is a businessman and lawyer, age 44, and maintains an office in Tulsa. He is the owner of several farms, oil and gas properties, and other interests, which are all worth about \$300,000.00, to which he devotes most of his time. From 1929 to 1932, he was a reader in a Tulsa Christian Science church. From 1932 on, he considered himself as a substitute reader which he failed to prove. During the past several summers, he has gone to Boston, to study further the teachings of his church. He has talked to some persons, and has sought to benefit them through the Christian Science religion. He was unable to name the amount, or approximate the same, that he has earned from such alleged healing. The petitioner was held not to be exempted as a "minister" under the Act.

⁴⁰ Meredith v. Carter, *supra*; Drumheller v. Berks County Local Bd., *supra*.

The first time that the defendant "claimed to be a full fledged minister was after war was declared, and he had been called to the draft." U. S. v. Mroz, *supra*.

⁴¹ *Ibid*.

⁴² See footnote cases 25 to 39.

⁴³ A belief in pacifism by an American citizen is not unlawful. *State v. Hutterische Bruder Gemeinde*, 46 S. D. 189, 191 N. W. 635 (1922).

⁴⁴ The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This Amendment, which guarantees religious liberty, has been interpreted to mean "to allow everyone under the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such form of worship as he may think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of others, and to prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of worship of any sect. . . . It was never intended or supposed that the Amendment

violation of the Federal Draft Act is a could be invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society. . . . However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation. . . . Should a sect (with tenets encouraging crime) ever find its way into this country, swift punishment would follow the carrying into effect of its doctrines, and no heed would be given to the pretense that, as religious belief, their supporters could be protected in the exercise by the Constitution of the United States." *Davis v. Beason*, 133 U. S. 333 (1889). "To permit a man to excuse his criminal practices because of his religious belief . . . would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen

criminal offense,⁴⁵ it can readily be seen that a pacifist whose practices make him guilty of such offense cannot claim the defense of constitutional religious freedom.⁴⁶

to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances." *Reynolds v. U. S.*, 98 U. S. 145 (1878). Therefore no plea of religion can shield a person who commits a criminal offense, because the nation would be at the mercy of superstition, if criminal offenses could be "committed with impunity, because sanctioned by some religious delusions." *State v. Marble*, 72 Ohio St. 21, 73 N.E. 1063 (1905).

⁴⁵ See footnote cases 25 to 39.

⁴⁶ *U. S. v. Newman*, 44 Fed. S. 817 (1942); *Baxley v. U. S.* 134 Fed. (2) 937 (1943); *Race v. U. S.*, supra; *Meredith v. Carter*, supra; *Selective Draft Law Cases*, supra; and *Drumheller v. Berks County Local Board*, supra.

BOOK REVIEWS

Christianity and Classical Culture. A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine. By Charles Norris Cochrane. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, pp. x + 523. \$5.00.

Reinhold Niebuhr has well described Cochrane's work as a "profound analysis of the inadequacies of the classical mind in coming to terms with the unique realities of history, in contrast to nature or reason" (*The Nature and Destiny of Man*, II, p. 15). As such an analysis, the book is very valuable, but it presents itself as something more. This can be seen from a brief survey of its contents.

The Augustan order claimed finality for itself, a finality reflected in the ideas of *Roma aeterna* and of the *aeternitas* of the Roman emperors. Nevertheless, at the end of Trajan's reign the empire began to contract geographically, and after the third century "various aspects of collapse and reconstruction" (p. 114) led to the attempts of Constantine and his successors to "undertake a renovation of *Romanitas*" which was finally unsuccessful. "While Christianity contained elements which might be employed to reinforce

the established order, at the same time it embodied ingredients of a highly explosive character, sufficient indeed to shatter the already weakened faith in classical ideals and thus to empty the system of whatever meaning it still possessed" (p. 356). The primary error of the classical mind, as Augustine saw it, was "the fact that it acknowledged the claim of science to be architectonic and, therefore, entitled to legislate with sovereign authority for the guidance of human life" (p. 419). In Christ, on the other hand, the Christian found "a principle of understanding superior to anything existing in the classical world" (p. vi). The conflict of these ideals is the essential conflict; "the fall of Rome was the fall of an idea, or rather of a system of life based upon a complex of ideas which may be described broadly as those of Classicism; and the deficiencies of Classicism, already exposed in the third century, were destined sooner or later to involve the system in ruin" (p. 355).

Obviously there is considerable truth in such an interpretation, especially as it supplements or supplants a too-easy economic or climatic view. But it too is one-sided.

"Every real theoretical advance consists in discovering that a phenomenon which was once believed to be an independent variable only seemed to be such because we had failed to take into account the special historical circumstances which gave it such extraordinary importance" (K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, p. 249). An interpretation of history almost exclusively in terms of ideas, like an interpretation "purely and simply in terms of the will of God" (p. 456), is an over-simplification, no less than an interpretation in terms of "nature" or "fortune." Mannheim's words (*op. cit.*, p. 187) are instructive, and warn of pitfalls which await the historian at every turning. "Most theorists are guided in deciding what is significant by certain expectations and prejudices which are characteristic of a prevailing scientific fashion or the interest of a given social class. . . . Their conflict can be settled not 'philosophically' but rather empirically by uniting the standpoints of various observers."

Thus to explain the ruin of the ancient world by "a moral and intellectual failure, a failure of the Graeco-Roman mind" especially in relation to the "classical *logos* of power" (p. 157) is to intellectualize history and to over-simplify historiography. No doubt this failure was a contributing factor; it was surely not the only or the primary one. Of various economic factors in the decline of Rome Rostovtzeff says (*Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, p. 484), "We may select one of these phenomena and declare it to be the ultimate cause; but it would be an arbitrary assumption which would not convince any one. The problem remains."

Some minor points require discussion. On p. 230 it is stated that Tertullian's belief in a material hell is "a vision of the disordered imagination without parallel except, perhaps, among his [rather Augustine's; see P. Miller, *The New England Mind*, pp. 3 ff.] spiritual descendants, the New England Puritans," while on p. 246 it is observed that "this [same] sort of thing was deeply rooted in the ideology of the early Church." Augustine himself insists on the corporeality of the fire. Instances in which the work is not completely satisfactory include the idea of "gnosticism" as pre-Christian (p. 159); the idea of Justin as illustrating the failure of philosophy (p. 222—the account of his "conversion" is

actually conventional); and the ascription of the source of Eusebius, *H.E.* v. 28, to "the period" (p. 232—it is actually third-century). The slight attention paid to economic factors in the Roman collapse is notable, as is the omission of reference to the history of late Imperial art as an index to intellectual life.

The fourth-century Christian view of the "significance of the Evangel as the culmination of a *praeparatio* which embraced the total spiritual experience of mankind" (p. 288), though it might today be accused of "liberalism" (and the name of A. C. McGiffert is misspelled on p. 378, n. 4), seems more in accordance with the facts than a picture of the Christian religion as antithetical to the thought and thought-forms of the world in which it developed. As G. L. Prestige has pointed out in his *God in Patristic Thought*, any attempt at a reasonable theology, ancient or modern, builds on those Greek philosophical foundations of which Christendom has become the chief surviving heir.

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John Dury: Advocate of Christian Reunion.
By J. Milton Batten. University of Chicago Press, 1944, pp. vi + 227. \$2.50.

With a number of men the cause of Christian unity has been an interest and an activity; with John Dury it was a solemn dedication and an all-controlling passion. To it he devoted a half-century of arduous labors and ceaseless travel, from 1628, when he took his first vow in the darkest days of the Thirty Years' War, to his death at Cassel in 1680. For the sake of reunion he was prepared to sacrifice all else as secondary, to endure repeated rebuffs without losing heart, to accept poverty, obloquy, exile. His efforts brought him into contact with princes, prelates statesmen, theologians, educators, and gave him a more exact and extensive knowledge of the state of continental Protestantism than any Englishman of his time possessed. To gain the half-hearted and insincere support of Charles I and Archbishop Laud, the Scotch Presbyterian accepted Anglican ordination. When Anglicanism fell in the Civil War, Dury, to continue his irenic work, shifted allegiance to Parliament and sat as a member of the Westminster Assembly. He served Cromwell both

at home and abroad, mediating between Presbyterians and Independents, as between Lutherans and Calvinists. At the Restoration he sought in vain to establish himself in the good graces of the second Charles that he might carry on his efforts toward unity under new sponsorship; but his past was remembered against him, and Dury had to quit England never to return.

Dury was an advocate of "practical divinity," of conference and discussion to arrive at agreement on "fundamentals." But as to precisely what constitutes "fundamentals" he was not explicit—nor could men agree then, as they cannot now. Characteristically impatient of dogmaticians, Dury the irenicist failed utterly to appreciate the tenacity with which theological convictions and denominational loyalties are held by churchmen and theologians. He tried (and in vain) to get around them rather than through them. Here was his weakness and lack of realism, as often today it is the weakness of Church unity advocates. Yet his dogged persistence commands our admiration, as the methods he urged largely anticipated those of our time, including the idea of a world-council of churches. His horizon, indeed, was limited; for the union which he sought was not only *without* Rome, but very clearly *against* Rome. But the circumstances of the seventeenth century were quite other than those of the twentieth.

Mr. Batten's book is evidently an expanded doctoral dissertation, fully documented and amplified by some years of research. It is the most complete and circumstantial account we possess of Dury's reunion efforts, and so of real relevance to the task of Christendom tomorrow. One may get an idea of the extent of the Scotchman's literary work in the field of irenics from the checklist of his published writings, just short of a hundred items over a period of fifty years.

P. V. NORWOOD

Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

The Doctrine of the Trinity. By Leonard Hodgson. New York: Scribners, 1944, pp. 237. \$2.50.

With the exception of Miss Dorothy Sayers' *The Mind of the Maker* (1941), which from an experiential and analogical standpoint constitutes a contribution to Trinitarian thought

of singular insight and originality, but which does not profess to be the work of a trained theologian, there has been for two decades or more a marked paucity of works on the doctrine of the Trinity. Not that the subject has been wholly ignored: witness the two essays in *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation* (1928) by Bishop Kirk and Canon Green; the lengthy exposition of the Trinitarian character of God in relation to revelation by Karl Barth in the original edition of his *Dogmatik*, Volume I (c. 1928); and Principal Micklem's chapter *The Holy Trinity* in *What Is the Faith?* (1936). Still the fact remains that for an unusually long period no full-dress treatment of this subject has appeared.

The appearance, accordingly, of Professor Leonard Hodgson's *Croall Lectures on The Doctrine of the Trinity* is an event of particular significance in the world of contemporary theology. The work is indeed not a long one, and does not profess to be in any way exhaustive. Many important aspects of the central core of the dogma of the Trinity, as well as numerous issues more subsidiary in character, are left to one side or given the most scanty attention. Yet Professor Hodgson has contrived not only to approach an old theme in a fresh way, and to make (at least from the standpoint of many) dry bones alive. He has done this, imparting to his book as a whole a feel of vitality and relevance. This alone is not a mean achievement. He has, however, done more. He has managed to bring within the compass of his treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity a number of the burning issues of contemporary theology, and philosophy as well, and to illuminate and clarify them. For example, he has a good deal to say regarding both the *locus* of revelation in the acts of God (not in propositions) and the relations of reason and revelation. He has a substantial treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity in relation to what might be called the crisis of philosophy in our day, precipitated by the empirico-skeptical reaction to idealism. This discussion is informed, balanced, and constructive. Further, in the authentic Oxford manner, Hodgson brings as it were instinctively the whole historic tradition associated with his subject to bear upon the meaning and understanding of the Holy Trinity in our day. He does this with marked economy and a deft mastery of complex ma-

terial. In the case of three classical theologians, Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin, he attempts rather ambitiously to interpret and re-evaluate in the light of history up to the present their Trinitarian constructions.

Hodgson's thesis is that "the Doctrine of the Trinity represents the conception of God involved in the Christian life of adopted sonship in Christ" (pp. 55 f.). The Christian, being an adopted son, is one who "looks out on the world from within the divine social life of the Blessed Trinity" (p. 55). He assumes without argument that the sonship of the Incarnate Son is the temporal expression of an eternal filial relation, and that God has revealed Himself as being within Himself a Trinity of persons. The familiar problem of if and how we are to proceed from the "economic" to the "ontological" Trinity is simply "by-passed" by Professor Hodgson. The same is true of the Trinitarian aspect of the conciliar dogma of the "two wills." He would be prepared presumably to speak of three wills in the Trinity, from the subjective standpoint, and would not be under the same necessity as the Fathers of holding tenaciously to two distinct wills in the one Lord Jesus Christ. It is fair to add that Hodgson is speculatively modest in handling the idea of social relations within the Godhead, and that in his distinction between unity of the "mathematical" and that of the "organic" type he has made a contribution that may prove to be of a seminal quality to our understanding of the ultimate unity of Godhead. Another question to which Hodgson devotes considerable attention is the "Heness" or personal character of the Holy Spirit. His affirmative conclusions here seem to me unassailable. On the place, however, of the third "person" in the eternal social life of God he has little light to shed; and a reconsideration of the Spirit as the "bond" or unity of the Father and the Son will lead back, I suspect, to the problems of "filiation" and "procession," which he boldly dismisses as unintelligible.

I wish to suggest only two other criticisms. (1) In his handling of the difficulty caused the Fathers and later Doctors by the "mathematical" conception of unity, Hodgson seems to me to overlook the role played by Old Testament monotheism. Take, for instance, St. Augustine. He, too, rejects the Greek Logos theory. The Holy Trinity becomes the

Creator and Revealer. But Augustine is influenced by the general Biblical idea of God as a single Divine personality—an eternal "I-am-that-I-am"—with whom the religious soul is in a personal relation. Contrariwise one wonders what Hodgson would say about the moral subordinationism of the New Testament ("my Father is greater than I," etc.), in view of his proposal to carry Trinitarian egalitarianism to the point of abolishing all theories of "filiation" and "procession." (2) Hodgson, who at some points is very free with tradition, comes out as unambiguously orthodox on the relation of God to the creation of the world. Creation is *per accidens*, in no sense a necessary or inevitable expression of the Divine love, since that love has already its perfect actualization within the social life of God. In this connection he criticises Temple severely. To a limited extent this criticism seems to me justified. The Archbishop remains at points in *Nature, Man, and God* the idealist metaphysician, assuming the possibility of a coherent rational system. Hodgson has done notable service in warning us all, philosophers included, that our contingent and sinful world cannot be made to fit any clear intelligible system of reality. Yet is this incompatible with saying that it is the nature of God both to create and to redeem the world, and that if He had not created and redeemed it, His nature would be other than in fact we know it to be? This, I believe, is a part at least of what Temple is contending for, and the issue is surely an important one, which should be disengaged from debate about the relation of "the creation of the world and the begetting of the Son."

Enough has been said to show that Professor Hodgson, considering the space he has allotted himself, has accomplished wonders, and that he has put all who are concerned with orthodox theology—using the phrase to denote not stereotyped repetition of ancient formulae but essential continuity with the stream of tradition—inestimably in his debt.

CHARLES W. LOWRY

Chevy Chase, Md.

Sociology of Religion. By Joachim Wach.
University of Chicago Press, 1944, pp.
xii + 412. \$5.00.

This is the first comprehensive treatment in English of the sociology of religion. Many

studies of a more specific kind, dealing with the interactions of religion with culture and social organization, and written by foreign and American scholars, have appeared in America. Professor Wach has sought to provide students with a text-book which re-casts some of his earlier work at Leipzig and which includes reference to more recent materials, especially in English.

The volume begins with an introductory section (Part I) on the method used in ordering and analyzing the data, of which there is a tremendous amount. The author attributes three separable forms of expression to religious experience: theoretical, in doctrine; "practical," in cultus; and sociological, in communion and fellowship. These aspects of religious life are then shown to have an integrating and/or differentiating influence in social process and development.

Part II, the main body of the work, reviews and generalizes the history of religious movements doctrinally, liturgically and institutionally as social forces, in terms of the data of anthropology, comparative religion, sociology and the history of religion and doctrine. The development from "natural" (kinship) religious groupings to "specifically religious" groups, such as secret and mystery societies or founded religions of the brotherhood and ecclesiastical types and their sub-types, is described ("primary" and "selective" association are more familiar American terms), and then Professor Wach discusses the social role of religion over a wide range of institutional levels and cultural areas. At the end is a section which offers a classification of religious authority.

The technical language, "heavy" style and ponderous foot-note references indicate that the author did not have students (as distinct from their teachers) at the center of his interest or concern. The book's learning is vast but it seems to this reviewer to fall short of impressing the subject's importance and rich content on the reader.

If this criticism is well founded it may be due partly to Professor Wach's cautious view of sociology as a "descriptive discipline" without any "normative" elements or value-judgments in it. All sociologists of religion could profitably read and digest the exposure of this pretention in Robert Lynd's *Knowledge for What?* and in the appendix to Gunnar

Myrdal's recent race study for the Carnegie Foundation, *The American Dilemma*.

Theological students will be gratified, probably, to find this book assigning a more determinative role to religion in social life than most sociologists would give it, but the reasonable balance with which Professor Wach accounts for the complexes of which religion is a part will favorably impress all but the most anti-religious of "purely descriptive" scholars. His emphasis on religion as an integrating factor is maintained, perhaps, at the expense of its influence as a *disintegrating* factor in society. This may be due, as an emphasis, to the author's interest in social cooperation rather than social conflict, but most students need to learn that social differentiation is not by any means the same as social conflict, and that the latter is often a more dynamic element of social change and cultural growth.

JOSEPH F. FLETCHER

Episcopal Theological School

Let's Think About Our Religion. By Frank Eakin and Mildred Moody Eakin. New York: Macmillan, 1944, pp. x + 251. \$2.00.

This book is an analysis of the thought and work of the church from the point of view of an enlightened, highly ethical, vaguely theistic humanitarianism. It is a book which, in spite of obvious shortcomings, must be taken seriously for its criticisms of routine church activities and for its constructive program of Christian action.

It is the authors' concern that the church should relate all its activities to increasing the good of the community. Traditional patterns of worship, routine preaching, and Bible-centered education simply have failed to make a real impact on modern American life. "In holding a narrow view of worship a church does disservice to itself. Almost any religious group has resources of current life available. The difficulty is that they are so little used; the worship stimulus they offer is too little recognized. As churches learn to give less exclusive attention to their Scriptures and hymns and sermons and private paternosters and more attention to what is going on in the inner lives of men and women and children and in our larger common life—as they undertake definitely and avowedly to help their adherents

attain a spiritual maturity which will enable them to find worship values independently of worship forms—then, and I think only then, will it be possible for them really to appreciate the religiousness of the Bible and their other inherited materials and, what is more important, really make institutional religion a good-life agency" (p. 124).

The major thesis is strengthened by concrete illustrations of what has been done in many communities—in church worship, in Christian education, and in summer conferences—to implement ideals with action. Services are cited which make religion seem contemporary and which lead to action; educational programs, particularly in week-day schools, which come to grips with the major problems of the particular community, such as race relations, labor problems, poverty, and juvenile delinquency, are exhibited. Summer conferences which failed utterly to define an adequate Christology still managed to make religion vital to their young people. It is a matter of implementation, which cannot be left to a supernatural God (as in traditional religion), which is the central problem of this very practical book.

Many of the practical suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of Christian living cannot be ignored by clergy or laity who have the future of the church at heart. Certainly reports from young people and from service men indicate that they will be indifferent to a church which in fact is nothing more than a social club, no matter what ecclesiastical sanction it may have.

In spite of these insights, one does not have to share the outlook of the Eakins to assimilate their suggestions into a church program. The Eakins have missed entirely the sense of corporateness in worship, while at the same time they are correct in demanding that worship must have contemporary significance. The insistence on a naturalistic humanism, with deity being nothing more than E. S. Ames' god of the social consciousness and Jesus simply more than a prophet, is not necessary for the promotion of every kind of good.

The Eakins have rebelled against the complacency of conservative churches, the irrationalism of Barthianism, and the ineffectiveness of non-dynamic liberalism, and so they have turned to a variation of "ethical culture," which has never provided the necessary

dynamic for the excellent program they have provided for the churches. Throughout history, there have always been idealistic groups proposing similar programs; the only trouble is that they do not work over a period of time, simply because there is no self-propelling power in vague theisms and gods of the social consciousness (like "Uncle Sam").

This book has the virtue of being practical, of suggesting programs that work. It relates religion to life. What is needed is an adequate theology to serve as the basis for implementation, and this is to be found not in conservatism or liberalism, but in a blend of the two which insists that Christianity is a way of life grounded in history and in the God revealed by Jesus Christ.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

Church Divinity School of the Pacific

What Is Education? By Edward Leen. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1944, pp. 288. \$3.00.

This book, dedicated to the Immaculate Heart of Mary, is a careful presentation of the principles which guide one group of Roman Catholic educators in Great Britain and the United States. It is highly controversial. Based on an extreme form of Thomism, it advocates "an education for aristocracy" and inveighs against modern developments in democratic education.

"Democracy," says the author, "as a political shibboleth of the hour has a connotation that is purely negative. It is a species of Protestantism, with something called Fascism as the thing protested against."

Different levels of education are suggested, on the basis of probable careers. "The practical element—in the mechanistic sense—should preponderate in the training of those who are to be artisans, whilst for those whom advantages of nature or of birth (italics mine) call to the government of people the education should be definitely humanistic in character."

Thus, workers will not be educated for public responsibility. Neither will women. Father Leen is violently anti-feminist and his chapter on "Education and Womanhood" is a sustained attack on those who would give women opportunities which might take them out of their homes. "For man, the building of the city; for woman, the building of the home."

"The women are led astray by the mirage of equality as they have been by the mirage of freedom."

Within the limits of his very narrow—and, one might say, perverse—concept of education, Father Leen makes some excellent suggestions. He is well aware of the lack of religious integration in many Catholic schools and would have all the studies definitely related to a central purpose. He finds much to criticize in the efforts to teach religion through the rote use of questions and answers from one of the accepted catechisms, which are, as he points out, arranged logically rather than psychologically. Teaching of the faith should, he holds, be centered on the Person of Jesus, as was that of the first Christians.

"They [the first catechists] gave the pagans not a system, but a personality. The whole effort of their catechism was to present to their auditors the life and works and character of Jesus. Christianity was belief in, acceptance of, and devoted loyalty to the Person of whom the Apostles spoke. These men made their whole object to get pagans and Jews to understand, to appreciate, to admire and to imitate Jesus, because He was what He was. Their catechism was Jesus. They spoke of His nature, His manhood, His divinity, His works, His moral teaching, His conflicts, His suffering, His death, and above all, of the wondrous supernatural life He offered to men. Their catechism was a narrative."

This, and other fine statements throughout the volume, contain unexpected dynamite which might explode some of the other views already mentioned and destroy the basic ground of the book which is, expressed somewhat arrogantly in these words: "The Church can not fail. From the beginning to the end she fulfills her part without error and without hesitation. She knows the doctrine she has to impart, and she employs adequate means to impart it."

ADELAIDE CASE

Episcopal Theological School

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Vol. XIX, *Philosophy in Post-War Reconstruction*. Ed. by Charles A. Hart. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America, 1944, pp. 200. \$2.00.

This volume consists of two parts. The first contains a series of essays on various themes

related to the main subject; the second half contains reports of round table discussions.

In Part One, we find discussed such subjects as "A Philosophy of the Absolute and Permanent Peace," "Toward the Rediscovery of Man," "The Natural Law, the Basis of International Law," "Some Moral Problems of a Victorious Army of Occupation," "International Cooperation in Philosophy," "Personalism and the Problem of the Individual in the State," "The Christian Conception of Law in the Post-War World," "Catholicism and Modern Liberalism," "A Philosophy of Education for the Post-War World." Each essay is, of course, by a different author. The tone and style vary greatly from essay to essay; some being of a quite technical and difficult character, others in a rather popular strain and of quite universal interest. The two essays which stand out as especially worthy of attention, in the opinion of the present reviewer, are the one on the rediscovery of man, and the one on the Christian concept of law in the Post-War World. The latter essay by Fr. Reilly of St. John's Seminary, Brighton, Mass., is especially thought-provoking and worthy of a careful reading.

Part Two, when compared with Part One, is relatively lacking in interest. The subjects discussed are of a more narrowly technical nature, and of much less interest to the non-professional philosopher.

There is much good material in this collection of essays which ought not to be ignored by anyone who is truly interested in post-war planning. It is in the realm of philosophy that the world's deepest problems must find their first solution, and this work is a definite contribution to such a solution.

ELMER JAMES TEMPLETON

Holy Trinity Church, Skokie, Ill.

The Englishman and His History. By H. Butterfield. Cambridge: University Press, 1944, pp. x + 142. \$1.25.

A notice on the dust cover of this book says that it is "the historian's answer" to the current problem contained in the question "What is the practical value—the use to-day of tradition?" The author, however, says that it is his object to "study the relations of Englishmen with their history and the means by which the past and present have been kept in alliance . . ." (p. vi). To this end the au-

thor gives over the first five chapters to a detailed analysis of the founding and growth of the Whig interpretation of English history, "as an aspect of the English mind and as a product of the English tradition" (p. 2). These chapters are, to a large extent, a working out of the theses of the author's earlier book, *The Whig Interpretation of History* (London, 1931, Bell). Part II, "The Political Tradition," with chapters on the Whigs in Action, the English Method and the French Revolutionary Method, and Christian Tradition as a Factor in Politics, shows how the Whig historians and Whig history contributed—and still contribute—to the making of political history.

If the book gives an answer to the question on the dust cover, it is that we should

praise as a living thing the continuity of our history, and praise the Whigs who taught us that we must nurse this blessing—reconciling continuity with change, discovering mediations between past and present, and showing what can be achieved by man's reconciling mind (p. 138).

The book is a most excellent, brief, detailed analysis of the origin and growth of the Whig interpretation. But its treatment of the Tudor period, the historians and the Stuarts, Sir Edward Coke, the *Nullus liber homo* clause, Grafton, Spelman, and many other persons and matters seems addressed to the historian—indeed, to the specialist in English history—rather than to the general reader who has neither the interest nor the time to "get up" the details which fill so large a part of Prof. Butterfield's volume.

The dusty answer given to the question about the use to-day of tradition seems to be only a particular—a provincial—instance of Toynbee's general conclusion that neither an archaistic attempt to revive the past nor a futuristic leap out of the present in the other direction can be a successful response to any challenge. The book is provincial, too, in that it treats the whole development of English tradition and historiography as if that development were, in itself and in isolation, an intelligible field of study; that is, as if English history could be understood as a self-sufficient and isolated development. No doubt Prof. Butterfield would not subscribe to such a thesis, but the book is written from such a point of view.

The insights in the chapter on the Christian Tradition are penetrating and profound:

Even if only a shadow of the Christian Tradition still hangs across our path, we can hardly surrender to the mythology of the deified state (p. 133). If any man says, "I have the only solution that would save the world, therefore all must follow my method, and I will co-operate with no other," he will waste the rest of his life in querulousness, not knowing that his complaints are against Providence itself (p. 136).

The book as a whole, as an account of the Whig interpretation, is excellent and will be of value to all those interested in the subject. But, because its perspective is too short and its range too narrow, it is of little value as a discussion of the use to-day of tradition or of what can and should be done in the post-war reconstruction. The decisions taken by Englishmen during the coming years will have to be based upon considerations other than those that can be drawn from English history alone.

EDWARD D. MYERS

Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.

The New Testament of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. Newly Translated from the Vulgate Latin at the Request of their Lordships, the Archbishops and Bishops of England and Wales. By R. A. Knox. Sheed and Ward, 1944, pp. vi + 573. \$3.00.

During the past seven years the Roman Catholic Church has produced three new English translations of the New Testament. For a church which is commonly credited with a desire to withhold the Scriptures from its people, this is doing rather well! These three translations ought to be enough to disprove the popular conception of the Roman Catholic view of the place of Scripture-reading in the Christian life.

The first of these was the magnificent translation done by Father Spencer (Macmillan, 1937). This was based on the Greek text and was characterized not only by accurate scholarship, but also by beautiful English. The next was the St. Anthony Guild publication of the revision of the Challoner-Rheims Version in 1941—a well known publication, since it has been on sale everywhere, even in drugstores and the five and ten.

Now comes an excellent version based on the Vulgate rather than the Greek text, also characterized by very beautiful English. It is not nearly so literal a rendering as most modern English translations of the New Testament, but it can hardly be called a paraphrase. It is designed to be read "as living literature" and it certainly will be so read. Take, for example, such well known passages as the following—I don't need to give the references, they are so well known. "And now about meat that has been used in idolatrous worship." "There was a sabbath day, on which he was asked to take a meal with one of the chief Pharisees." "But Zacchaeus stood upright and said to the Lord, Here and now, Lord, I give half of what I have to the poor." "At the beginning of time the Word already was; and God had the Word abiding with him, and the Word was God." Some of these passages are pretty close to paraphrase; and yet the question must be asked, "What is translation after all but the expression of the meaning of the original in another language? It is no simple game of exchanging counters like coins, each standing for an exact equivalent in the other language. Idiom is of the very essence of language; and the interpretation of idiom, the translation of idiom, the use of idiom in expressing the thought which has been translated is one of the trickiest tasks the translator faces.

I am personally very enthusiastic about this translation, and perhaps I can give my reason for such enthusiasm by quoting at length one of the really difficult passages in the New Testament:

"Consider this; one who comes into his property while he is still a child has no more liberty than one of the servants, though all the estate is his; he is under the control of guardians and trustees, until he reaches the age prescribed by his father. So it was with us; in those childish days of ours we toiled away at the school-room tasks which the world gave us, till the appointed time came. Then God sent out his Son on a mission to us. He took birth from a woman, took birth as a subject of the law, so as to ransom those who were subject to the law, and make us sons by adoption. To prove that you are sons, God has sent out the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying out in us, Abba, Father. No longer, then, art thou a slave, thou art a son; and because thou art a son, thou hast the son's right of inheritance. Formerly you had no knowledge of God; you lived as the slaves of deities who were in truth

no deities at all. Now you have recognized the true God, or rather, the true God has recognized you. How is it that you are going back to those old school-room tasks of yours, so abject, so ineffectual, eager to begin your drudgery all over again? You have begun to observe special days and months, special seasons and years. I am anxious over you; has all the labour I have spent on you been useless?" (Galatians 4: 1-11.)

Again, some of this will be looked upon as paraphrase rather than translation; but the purpose of the new translation, like the purpose of the Vulgate on which it is based, is certainly to enable the rank and file of people to read the New Testament in their native tongue and understand it. It achieves this purpose. There can be no higher commendation.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Union Theological Seminary

The Iliad of Homer. A Line for Line Translation in Dactylic Hexameters. By William Benjamin Smith and Walter Miller. Macmillan, 1944, pp. xx + 565. \$3.75.

This is a superbly beautiful book and a great credit to its publishers. No wonder it was chosen by the Trade Book Clinic of the American Institute of Graphic Arts as their October selection! In addition to its superb typography, the book has the benefit of superb illustrations—reproductions of thirty-nine of Flaxman's famous drawings.

The author of this translation, William Benjamin Smith, was well known in theological circles a generation ago as a champion of the "Christ myth theory." He had worked upon the translation for many years, often revising it, and upon his death in 1934 he left it in the hands of his life-long friend, Professor Walter Miller of the University of Missouri, who further revised it. Suggestions for revision were also made by such eminent Homeric scholars as Professor John A. Scott and Professor Samuel E. Bassett. It ought, therefore, to be the last word in translation of the *Iliad*. I must confess, however, that I am disappointed in it. It does not rise as a whole to the level of the high anticipation set up before its appearance—even though there are many magnificent lines.

As Professor Bowra has remarked, in his preface to the *Oxford Book of Greek Verse in Translation*, "the unit of composition [in

Homer] is not the stanza, but the single line." We ought, therefore, to expect each line to be more or less complete in itself. That, however, would be to misinterpret Homer completely. Primitive poetry runs along a line at a time—but not Homer, who is far from primitive. He has the full-breasted surge of the sea in him, and it sometimes takes a dozen lines for the full sweep of one of his gigantic waves of narrative to come to a close. English hexameter does not do this, especially when it is done line by line. English hexameter is monotonous, as in *Evangeline*. There are almost no caesuras—and when there are, they light upon the wrong words or come at the wrong place in the line. So it is with this translation, again and again. It takes a poet to translate a poet; lacking such a translator, we had better be content with good prose translations. In order to crowd the meaning of each line of Homer into an equivalent line of English it is often necessary to shorten words or to fall back upon archaisms. For example:

"Morning shall furnish the test of his manhood, whether he bideth
Haply the rush of my spear or rather, I ween,
in the vanguard
Stricken he lie on the ground and with comrades many around him,
When on the morrow the sun shall arise."

Now of course it may be thought that Homer wrote an archaic style; he praised an age that was gone. He talked the language of knights and warriors, though the days of chivalry had now passed their flower—like Cervantes writing his *Don Quixote*. Moreover he wrote in a dialect that was no longer the old, pure Ionic, but was nevertheless more Ionic than anything else—and on Gilbert Murray's theory the Homeric poems were first sung at Athens during the pan-Athenaia festival in the days of Peisistratus,

where the language was certainly old Attic. You might therefore expect an archaic or archaizing translation to be just the thing. But the effect is different. Let me illustrate by quoting one of the most famous passages—one that greatly appealed to William Cullen Bryant, and one that he himself translated beautifully. It is the last thirteen lines of Book VIII. The version of Smith and Miller reads:

"So they, cherishing hopes full high on the bridges of battle
Waited and sate all night, and the watch-fires kindled were many.
Even as stars that encircle a radiant moon in the heavens
Glitter conspicuous, whenso the air is lulled and is windless,
Then shine all of the lookouts clear and the uttermost headlands,
Glens, too, and under it ether immensurate gleameth from heaven,
All of the stars are seen, and the heart of the shepherd rejoices;
Even so many the fires, that the Trojans burned between Xanthus'
Streams and the ships, were blazing in front of Ilium city.
Fires on the plain were burning, a thousand; alongside of each one
Warriors fifty were seated there in the gleam of their campfires.
Meanwhile, champing the spelt and the white-grained barley, the horses
Stood at the chariots fast and awaited the fair-throned Morning."

There are many beautiful lines in this translation, along with many that are quite pedestrian. We have not yet achieved in English the perfect translation of Homer: but we are on our way and the present translation no doubt marks a stage in our progress.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Union Theological Seminary

NOTES ON NEW BOOKS

Can We Still Believe in Immortality? By Frederick C. Grant. Louisville: Cloister Press, 1944, pp. xvi + 151. \$2.00.

Another helpful book by Dr. Grant. The author holds that we not only can believe in immortality but must, not because of the rational coercion of any scientific argument, but rather in obedience to an imperative which is both rational and moral.

He presents no new "proofs," nor should we expect any. His book is a careful and fresh restatement of reasons for belief in immortality as they appear to a scholar who is keenly appreciative of spiritual values. Fundamental to any argument for immortality is one's doctrine of Man. What is Man? What is his relation to or

kinship with the world and with God? What is the meaning of his age-long strivings for and devotion to ideals which can never be fully realized in this present life? Is it not tremendously significant that man is, in fact, a creature who can raise the question of immortality as the brute creation can not? Such, in brief, are the bases from which Dr. Grant develops his appealing argument.

P. S. K.

The Christian Way in a Modern World. By W. Norman Pittenger. Louisville: Cloister Press, 1944, pp. iii + 194. \$2.50.

This book is an attractive and persuasive restatement of the fundamental bases of orthodoxy in words and thought categories of today. The full content of traditional Christianity is treated in a calm, uncontroversial manner. The Christian Way, as the author sees it, is that of the faith as it has been received through Creeds, Sacraments, and the Church. The style is simple and pleasing, and there are just enough illustrations and literary allusions to hold the reader's attention. The author is well awake to the present world situation, and throughout the book seeks carefully to relate the Christian Way to the modern scene. There is nothing particularly new here, but the freshness of the presentation of Catholic fundamentals should make the book most welcome.

P. S. K.

We Preach Not Ourselves. By Gordon Poteat. New York: Harpers, 1944, pp. vi + 185. \$2.00.

Two factors cooperate to make Dr. Poteat's book a welcome addition to the literature of preaching. First is the rising tide of interest in "Biblical preaching," particularly among the younger men in the Christian Ministry, as contrasted to the "topical" method with its danger of subjectivism and lack of real authority. Second is the need long felt for homiletical commentaries written from the viewpoint of modern biblical studies and with an understanding of the scientific critical approach. Although the author disclaims any intention of writing a commentary, his exposition of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians succeeds in doing what the older homiletical commentaries did for their day. It provides an abundance of stimulating and

suggestive material for the contemporary preacher.

The author takes for his task the setting forth of preaching as "A testimony to God in Christ" with the Bible as "its primary material because it is the source of our knowledge of Jesus Christ." How to make use of the Bible "while loyally faithful to the scientific method" is answered by Dr. Poteat not by argument but by demonstration.

This is no book of sermons nor of sermon outlines but a source of homiletical material. Its value is in no way lessened by a few typographical errors and inaccuracies of statement. (An example of the later is found in the reference to Peter Drucker as the author of *The End of Industrial Man*. He wrote *The End of Economic Man* and *The Future of Industrial Man*.) Dr. Poteat's interpretation of the eucharistic passage in the eleventh chapter of First Corinthians will not be regarded as adequate by the sacramentally minded. Nor will the by-passing of the social implications of certain passages from First Corinthians commend this book unreservedly to those who believe that the Christian message involves more than the relation of *individuals* to God and to other individuals.

However, this book is in the main a useful and practical answer to a widely felt need.

A. D. K.

Down Peacock's Feathers. By D. R. Davies. New York: Macmillan, 1944, pp. xii + 188. \$1.75.

"Wherefore, good people, let us beware of such hypocrisy, vain-glory, and justifying of ourselves. Let us look upon our feet; and then down peacock's feathers, down proud heart, down vile clay, frail and brittle vessels." This gorgeous rhetoric from the Book of Homilies provides a title for a singular species of book, a homiletical commentary on the General Confession in Morning Prayer. Mr. Davies is thoroughly acquainted with the facts of modern economic and political life and has a firm grasp both of social theory and Christian theology. He is neo-orthodox in his interpretation of man and sin, and a "prophetic radical" in his approach to social problems and his desire for a planned society and an economics of abundance. With it all, he is an unusually incisive and exciting writer. This

is a good book for a preacher to read, even if—especially if—he does not completely agree with it.

S. E. J.

Soldiers' Bibles through Three Centuries. By Harold R. Willoughby. University of Chicago Press, 1944, pp. viii + 43 + 16 plates. \$1.00.

Two connecting threads run through most of the recent work of Professor Willoughby: his fascination with the "human interest story" of the Bible as a book read and treasured and published by all sorts and conditions of men; and his delight—which he readily communicates—in fine printing and artistic embellishment as they are applied to the Book of Books. Here he makes available to us a facsimile of the Cromwellian Soldier's Bible of 1643, which was actually a catena of scripture texts, and the story of its frequent reprinting, even in America as late as 1917; together with an essay on "American War Bibles," and a bibliography. As always, there is here a contribution to learning, and the facts are assembled with painstaking accuracy.

S. E. J.

The Threshold of Marriage. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1944, pp. 31. \$0.30 (\$3.00 per dozen).

This is the American edition of a pamphlet originally issued by the Church of England Moral Welfare Council, and contains a foreword by Dr. Almon R. Pepper of the staff of 281 Fourth Avenue. There are other books which go into the problems of marriage in greater detail, but this contains the necessary facts, and is written with good taste and dignity and with full attention to the claims of the Christian religion. Priests will find it extremely useful in preparing young couples for matrimony.

S. E. J.

Chronicle of an American Crusader. By Samuel S. Mayerberg. New York: Bloch, 1944, pp. xvi + 148. \$1.50.

In these Alumni Lectures delivered at the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, Rabbi Mayerberg of Congregation B'nai Jehudah in Kansas City tells of the experiences of his ministry. To him belongs much of the credit

for breaking the hold of the nauseous Pendergast machine on Kansas City politics, but the book tells much more than that; it is the warm and moving story of a life work which is in the best Jewish and American tradition. This volume is of more interest to the Christian than most current Jewish works, for it gives a real insight into what the work of a reformed rabbi, at its best, can be.

S. E. J.

Flower Arrangement in the Church. By Katharine Morrison McClinton. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1944, pp. xii + 105. \$1.50.

It is gratifying to pick up a book that fills such a tremendous need and is at the same time so delightfully written.

Nothing is more discouraging to good church people than the dismal flower arrangements often seen in even our larger churches. Here is someone who grasps the situation and offers a most constructive solution of the problem. We feel that every altar guild or flower committee could use this book to advantage.

We like especially Mrs. McClinton's fine distinction between glorifying the altar with flower arrangements that are consistent with ecclesiastical custom and the regulation decorating of the church that is more often seen.

This book will assist us all with its helpful and inspiring suggestions and will prove an excellent guide book to people who wish to serve their church in this capacity, but who feel inadequately prepared for the responsibility.

E. C. B. AND K. B. L.

The Ways and Teachings of the Church. By Lefferd M. A. Haughwout. New York: Morehouse-Gorham, 1944, pp. xiv + 128. \$0.60.

This book is a new edition of one published some years ago. The whole text has been revised; a new chapter has been added, and several new illustrations have been included. This book will be most valuable as a church school text-book, or a manual for confirmation, or to present to a general inquirer. It is packed with invaluable information. Each chapter has, at the end, a set of questions on the text and a list of suggested topics for further study. There are three parts. Part

One covers the Church and its Worship; Part Two, the Holy Catholic Church, its History and its Faith; Part Three, Confirmation. All in all a most attractive manual for a serious study.

P. S. K.

The Way of Worship: a Study in Ecumenical Recovery. By Scott Francis Brenner. New York: Macmillan, 1944, xxv + 200. \$2.00.

This is a vigorous and forthright plea for the restoration of liturgical and sacramental worship on the part of evangelical Christendom to its rightful place as the complement of the ministry of the Word. "The Church of the Reformation rightly regarded the Word and the Sacraments as the diastolic and the systolic action of the Liturgy." Such a restoration is imperative if the ecumenical movement is to be clothed upon with reality and substance. The book contains very definite recommendations for the revival of traditional liturgical forms, vestments, and ceremonies, so far as this may be possible without provoking disastrous conflict. Worship must be Eucharist-centered, not based upon the choir office. Morning Prayer will not do, because as a vehicle of public worship it lacks the sanction of both antiquity and ecumenicity. In some respects the standards here set up and the usages advocated are more "advanced" than those prevailing in certain Anglican circles, and might make some of us rub our eyes in amazement. As an unabashed expression of one significant current in contemporary Protestantism, the book might conceivably be provocative of a controversy akin to that aroused years ago in the Episcopal Church by the publication of Bishop Hopkins' *Law of Ritualism*.

The author of this remarkable manifesto is not, however, a Presiding Bishop! A leading minister of the Evangelical and Reformed Church, he is thoroughly familiar with the Anglican liturgical tradition and holds advanced degrees from one of our theological schools. His debt to the interesting "Mercersburg Movement" of liturgical recovery in his own communion is evident throughout.

P. V. N.

Richard Peters: Provincial Secretary and Cleric, 1704-1776. By Hubertis Cummings. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944, pp. viii + 347. \$3.00.

A lively portrait of a somewhat too secular clergyman who played a prominent part in the history of Pennsylvania in the generation preceding the Revolution; protégé of the Penn family, associate of Provost Smith in the founding of the College of Philadelphia, and sponsor of the youthful William White. Primarily a politician and man of affairs, Peters' activities as a churchman centered about the Parish of Christ and St. Peter's, which he served briefly as assistant in his youth, and as rector during the last years of his eventful life. In the interval of a quarter-century he was Secretary of the Provincial Council and a trusted agent of the Proprietor. The volume is one of the series of "Pennsylvania Lives."

P. V. N.

Contemplative Prayer. By Shirley C. Hughson, O.H.C. West Park: Holy Cross Press, 1944, pp. xii + 186. \$2.00.

This is a reprint, even to the extent of containing the same misprints, of all of Father Hughson's book of 1935, except that the final pages of "Exercises of Affective and Contemplative Prayer" have been omitted. It is heartening to know there is a demand for this really great book on the higher states of prayer.

W. F. W.

The Idea of a Theological College. By Frederick C. Grant. Gambier, Ohio: Kenyon College, 1944 (Bulletin 191), pp. 21.

A plea for a new and better—or an old and better—ideal of theological education, dominated by "the habitual vision of greatness" seen in Christ, and characterized by vigorous, thorough scholarship, wide human sympathy, spiritual and moral discipline, in order to fit men for the great tasks confronting the Christian ministry at the present day.

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